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CHJI..IF.MJI..N ELIHU M. HARRIS: This is the Assembly
Judiciary Committee hearing on the subject of community property.
Specifically, we will
looking into the issues presented in
Sullivan v. Sullivan. Our purpose today is to explore
legislative so
to the problem of dealing with so-called
"career assets." At
, career assets include the
education,
and
obtained when one
spouse puts the other spouse through school.
In many cases, the
marriage ends before the coromunity reaps the benefits from the
financial investment made in the education or enhanced earning
capacity.
The issue before us is whether the career assets should
be
stributed between
ses upon divorce and, if so, hmv
the division should be made
to Sullivan, was heard
AB 525, a
sal in re
earlier this
whereupon
was sent to interim study.
This hearing
AB 525 but also other
and enhanced
comments from
s

2

an opportunity to discuss not only
for
ing with career assets
s end, we've requested
property and family law.

~he author of AB 525, As
lyman Alister McAlister, is
s point to open on the
with us, and I wou
1
ister at
bill.

ALISTER McALISTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The reason
a period of years of
reflection, that I
, over problems that arise from
the basic
exist
dissolution laws, property
distribution laws on
occasion of
ssolution, to women. No
doubt, divorce i
a
ry
event in most cases. Certainly,
there are instances where men have ended up with disagreeable
and, I suppose, even unfair results. Yet, in the vast majority
of cases it is women
suf r
lly. This can be
established by and
s been established
any number of
statistical and scholarly studies that show within a few years of
divorce, in any event usually at any period of time after the
divorce, that the divorced woman and her children, who are
usually given to her
, are suffering whereas the
divorced man is not, at least not
lly, and at least not in
comparison to the suffe ng
woman and her children are
suffering.
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Support
support, are usual
record, but the inadequacy
these orders is
these orders
inadequate) were
not enforced, not very
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quite low. In many cases,
time, either as a matter of
matter.

and child
ly a matter of
The enforcement of
scandal because, if
start out
But
're
s
rcentage of
that are enforced
orders is really
ends after a period of
or as a practical

So what do
AB 525 is my
attempt to at least
fully, accomplish
something very
lem. AB 525
recognizes that, when a man
a woman
, they have made a
commitment, that
is not just, or even primarily, a romantic
commitment but that
is a soc
, a human, and at bedrock an
economic commitment. If it is not. all of those things, then one
party or the other,
the woman,
dissolution is going
to get it in the neck.
f
all of those things, then the
weaker party, the economical
party, upon dissolution is
going to suffer,
s.
Now, the
woman as a matter
contributed
1
regardless of the
and the other not
the other ...
because they
agreed that
illustrate one
all aspects of
media has been
wi , works to put
of professionaJ
graduates and is
divorce ensues.
before the State
guess the Court
us what they're
that my bill raises
think it real
makes a
that, and I don't envy
they've got one case be
are strongly in
unsatisfactorv to a
to decide that one case
precedent but
11,
the area of law
11 real

the man and the.
passed, have
they have contributed
working outside the home
mak
far m0re money than
ly contributed
between themselves
current
11 is

sing that
ssed to
licity in the
spouse, usually the
1 (through some kind
the t
that the husband
good monPy, a
Sullivan case pending
, and I
and tell

it, because
say the odds
going to be very
do. They've got
some kind of
a way that
slature's

job, it seems to me, to make the law and certainly to make the
law in this field, and it's certainly our job to reflect the
social consensus.
It doesn't seem to me that we ought to rely on
the Court to pull our chestnuts out of the fire in that respect.
Now, I'm aware that in one respect this bill, or
anything like it, is running against a certain tide in which it
is represented that the sexes are now equal, that they are super,
super equal and that therefore, if a marriage doesn't work out,
that's just tough luck and they ought to both go their merry way
without in any way depending on the other.
I submit to those
women who make that argument that they are making the argument
that men's rights groups perhaps might make with some
justification from the standpoint of their own self-interest, but
it's not a very good argument for women to make. The facts are
that, I don't care how far you take equalization, there will
always be a substantial number of women who will decide right
along with their husbands that they're going to devote most of
their time to the home and that they will not go into the work
force.
I assume that we're not going to have a law to require
everybody, male and female, to go out 100 percent into the work
force and become truly economically equal. Unless that happens,
\ve' re always going to have a large number of worren mostly who are
going to suffer from what the traditional housewife suffers from
when she is divorced, if she doesn't have the substantial means
of going out into t.he world and supporting herself. You will
have many other women who will work substantially for a period of
years but who will not give
the kind of undivided attention
that the husband does, again largely because of family
commitment. Then you \vill have those women who, doubtless, will
take advantage of everything that your equality offers to them,
\>lho will go out and become star lawyers, doctors, businesswomen
a:r.c1 so forth.
I submit, though, that the number of women in that
category will probably never exceed, maybe, 20 to 30 percent who
will really achieve that kind of equality.
Certainly, there wil~ be large numbers of women who will
never be on an equal basis from an economic standpoint. Now, in
those cases where they are, of course, my bill isn't going to
have much effect.
If men and women are truly equal in a given
marriage, then, of course, my bill doesn't have any effect at
all. But it's ::or that much larger number where there really
isn't that kind of equality that this bill and this concept are
intended. Therefore, I think I've basically stated the
foundation for my legislation, and I'll await with eagerness the
comments, pro and con.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
McAlister.

All right.

Thank you, Assemblyman

I would like also to introduce my colleagues,
Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly and Assemblywoman Sunny Mojonnier.
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in what she had helped him to generate not only by helping him
financially through college but by taking over their jointly
incurred responsibilities in the home, responsibilities that
belonged equally to him, which had he taken over these himself he
would not have been able to pursue his career full time ana
continuously as he did.
I would just like to read this last
paragraph, if I may, Mr. Chairman. ,JoAnn writes:
"I am angry over the hypocrisy of law that retrospectively denies the equality of my worth with
that of my husband .... angry over [and I speak in
terms of worth, not necessarily financial worth
but worth to the family, to society, and to
posterity, that her worth in the home was equal
with his in these areas, with his work in his
career field] having been placed in retroactive indentured servitude to him for the
duration of our marriage (and largely so for
three years afterward) ..•• angry over having been
forced into the position of a beggar in the courts .••.
angry over the put-down implicit in the court's
treatment of me under law that is supposed to treat
the two parties to a divorce as having had equal
dignity and worth throughout their marriage, with
no fault charged to either party, but which has
treated me as though I had been the culprit. And
I am angry that millions of other women have
been treated with the same kind of injustice
in short, exploited."
CHAI~~N

Patricia

HARRIS:

Thank you.

The next witness will be

rzog.
ASSEMBLYMAN LLOYD CONNELLY:

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
the previous witness?

Yes.

Elihu, could I •••

Do you want to ask a question of

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: No, not a question to the
previous witness but maybe a request to the witnesses who will be
testifying.
I could be wrong, and I don't know because I really
haven't chatted with the members of thE~ Committee hear today.
I
think there is universal acceptance that the present system is
inequi ta.ble and improper.
I don't think there's any debate.
I
could be wrong among my Committee members.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
have to say.

You may be.

I'm listening to what you

ASSEMBLYM~N CONNELLY:
There is improper consideration
qiven to that now. There are four or five different ways to deal
with tha.t. One is to allow the courts to consider the earning
capaci t.y ar-quired in the determination of what spousal support
is. Another is to require repayment out of the community
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Intangible property is not a new concept in our judicial
interpretations. The Court has had to expand the definition of
community property to try to undo some of the absolutely
horrendous results of our Family Law Act, to divide the property
evenly between the parties. This facially sounds like an
equitable thing, but what
has worked out to be -- and we all
know this to be true and I think you have an excerpt from Lenore
Weitzman's article in here, showing that it is not producing
justice -- what it has resulted in is that, in the vast majority
of divorces, the only community property very often is a family
home which then has to be sold and the wife and the children are
put out to try and find places that will rent to someone with
children.
It has not worked well.
I think that one of the
things that you miq.ht want to think about is adopting what many
other states have adopted, namely equitable division.
Actually, the McAlister bill -- I think it's well
motivated.
I think it has a snowball's chance in hell of
passing, and I think it's probably unworkable. But I think that
there are other methods of ameliorating the injustice of our
present system.
In arguing the case before the trial court here,
after the preliminary hearing had eliminated any chance of our
putting on evidence to show the value of the degree that Dr.
Sullivan obtained, I argued that the court should use subsection
nine of the spousal support section, which says "In determining
spousal support •.• other equitable considerations"-- I think is
the word that's used, but I'm not positive.
I asked the court to
award her spousal support based not on her need (at the time, she
was earning twenty thousand dollars; Dr. Sullivan, who had just
started his private practice was earning twenty-five thousand
dollars) but on the basis of some sort of equitable
consideration. The court turned me down.
I then asked t.he court to reserve jurisdiction to award
her some consideration in the future when Dr. Sullivan's practice
ivould be more thoroughly established.
I suggested to the court
that it reserve jurisdiction so that she could come into court in
a year or two or three and ask at that time for support so that
she could go and get her professional degree. She needed an MBA
because she was an economist, and she could really have used
that. The court refused to do that. Now, if you're a practicing
lawver you know that you cannot, if you are a spouse who is
receiving support, you can't go into court later and say, "I want
support because I've quit my job." If you're fired and you can't
get a job, then you can get support, but you can't go into court
and say, "I quit; now I want my ex-husband to support me." That
doesn't fly.
So I asked the court to make a reservation based on
that particular set of facts and suggestions. The court couldn't
and didn't do that. However, the Legislature, as I say, ccm do
marvelous things. You're not bound by the same rules that the
courts are.
When I originally took this case (and here's another
thought for you to throw around), I knew that Dr. Sullivan had
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established his medical practice after separation.
In our
pleadings, we listed a community interest in the medical
practice. My thinking at the time was that, even though the
practice was established after they had separated and therefore
was separate, his practice consisted of two component parts. A
large component part was his energy and work, all of which after
separation was separate, but there was a component in that
practice which '\vas his education and training.
In my own mind I
thought, "Well, probably it would be just if 80 percent of his
earnings were attributable to his separate effort and 20 percent
to the education '\!Thich he received during the community. Then,
if Janet were awarded 10 percent of his gross income for the same
number of years that he was in school while they were marriPd,
that would, in effect, be an equitable way of solving that.
Well, of course, that runs into a number of prohibitions in terms
of the judicial determination; however, it seems to me that is
something you might think about.
I believe that the Supreme
Court is going to come in 'vi th some kind of a determination that
an education is a form of intangible property. The economists
call it "investment in human capital." It is an investment in
human capital, and the people who invest in it are entitled to a
return.
Another way of looking at it is that professional
education is work, and it's work when it is during the marriage.
It's work performed during the marriage.
It differs from
employment in that the compensation for that work is deferred,
and those of you who are domestic relations lawyers know that
deferred compensation for work performed during a marriage is
communit.y property and has been for some time in California.
I think the Court's going to come in with a ruling that
it's property.
I'm not sure that that kind of a ruling, no
matter how they structure the valuation problem, is going to do
justice in every case.
I'm only sure that the present system
does injustice in practically every case.
I think one of the other things that you should consider
is that, when people invest in education, they expect a return
from it. Therefore, if you have a longer marriage the nonstudent
spouse, has received a return on that investment. Also, another
thing to consider is that the value of the education is at its
rtle>.ximum right after graduation. Your law school training, your
medical training is most important. and most valuable right after
you graduate, and, as you practice, the education is replaced by
experience and good will in the value of your practice if you
happen to be in private practice.
CHAIIDA'..AN HAPRIS:
MS. HERZOG:

I.et me interrupt you just one minute.

Yes, I'm done; ask any question that you

like.
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MS. HERZOG:

Well, if your wife is staying horne •••

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. HERZOG:

No, she's not.

Oh, I see.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

If she's working herself ••.

Right.

MS. HERZOG: On the other hand, if she is not employed,
she is still making a contribution. That's what I'm saying to
you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm sure she thinks she's making a
contribution.
I don't dispute that, but, in terms of giving
anything up, I think she'd also tell you that she's not. She
doesn't intend to either. (Laughter from audience)
MS. HERZOG:

I don't know your wife.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. HERZOG:

I'd be happy to introduce you to her.

She's probably wise in not giving up

anything.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I don't disagree.

You mentioned an 80/20 split.
that 80/20 split?

How did you determine

MS. HERZOG: It was just off the top of my head.
is no way to determine it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
varies from case to case.
that what you're saying?

There

In other words, you're saying that it
It could be 20.
It could be 30. Is

MS. HERZOG: All I can say is that it struck me as a
possible answer to the problem that always arises when you talk
about determining thjs, an education, as property.
I call it
"the problem of the missionary doctor." You would think that 80
percent of the doctors are going to be missionaries the way this
comes up, but there is no doubt that some people after they get
an education opt for nonrernunerative or not very remunerative
positions. You might want to be an academic doctor in research.
You might, instead of being an attorney in private practice or
corporate practice, choose to be a legal. aid attorney.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. HERZOG:

Let me ask two other questions.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: One, could you give me your
perspective on why this couldn't be dealt with by a nuptial
agreement, either ante or postnuptial agreement?
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me give you an analogy. When we
look for a legal secretary, we look for a racehorse in my law
firm.
I'm saying that we're looking for somebody who is going to
outperform and outdistance the competition. Now, this is an
analogy. We're not talking about people being inhuman or being
like horses. We are talking about people who, in fact, are
thoroughbreds, people who are superior, people who outclass the
field.
That was my analogy.
Now, if you see a rising star, why would someone not
say, "Look, that guy is going some place, and I'm going to help
him so that I can ride his star to the future." With this bill,
somebody's going to get a certain percentage of that person's
future.
In other words, if he were really a hard worker (a
workaholic), he's going to work sixteen hours a day because he is
that kind of a person.
Somebody who may be married t.o that
person three or four years is going to then have a continuing
investment in that person.
It's just like having a piece of your
dreams.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:

111r. Harris,

could I make a point

here?
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: No, let me hear from the witness.
Then I would certainly like to hear from someone else.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:

I want to answer your question

for her.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, but I asked her.

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: What's wrong with investing in a
racehorse? Aside from the moral problems that some might have in
investing in things that are going to be used for gambling,
what's wrong with investing in something that you think is going
to pay off? If you invest in a racehorse and it does pay off,
you've gotten money
ck on your investment. Most of these
divorced women haven't gotten anything on their investment.
MS. HERZOG: The problem is that the racehorse can't
walk away by itself but a husband certainly can. That's one of
the problems of investing in human capital.
If you buy a
machine, the machine sits there and can 1 t go away until it breaks
down and doPsn't run anymore.
Investing in human capital,
increasing the productivity of a human being, is a risky
investment because the human being may die or, in this case, may
walk away or take off.
So I think that as to your idea, that
what's wrong with investing in a person, there's nothing wrong in
it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I didn't say it was wrong.
asking what the difference was.
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I was

MS. HERZOG: Well, the difference is that the horse is
there for you to control, among other things.
There are other
differences, of course.
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS:
questions?

All right.

Are there any other

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: As I understand, your bottom line
would be a formula that considers the increased earning capacity
in accordance with Alister's concept but takes 80 percent off the
top, contributes that to personal initiative or skill ••.
MS. HERZOG:

Effort.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY:
.•• which, you know, takes 80
percent of Alister's bill away, but then, second, places a cap in
terms of the number of years equal to the time it tonk to receive
the education.
MS. HERZOG: Yes. Now, in Mr. McAlister's bill, he
doesn't limit it to education.
He talks about any increase in
earning capacity.
I think that, if you were going to apply that
kind of formula, then you would have to put a cap on it in terms
of years based on the nu~ber of years of the marriage if the
increase is due to the work performed during the marriage.
If I may just say one more word, I think a more
realistic approach might be a formula to determine reasonable
support based on the earnings of the two.
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY:
So what you're saying is to get
away •.. because
can see some-- and Alister and I have
graciously arm wrestled on it -- there's some enormous inequity
potential under any formula because there are high-earning,
short-education periods ...
MS. HERZOG:

Right.

P..SSEMBLY~1AN CONNELLY:
.•. long-education periods, lowearnings, so forth and so on. But you would prefer then, just so
I understand your testimony, that actually the breadth of area in
which the trial court can rule involving spousal support would be
expanded to equitable considerations, specifically, earning
capacity acquired during the course of a marriage?

MS. HERZOG:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY:
leave Jt at that?

Something that simple and then

Let me just respond and deal with the California Law
Rev;i_sion Commission. As you knovl, they've already considered
that.

-14-

MS. HERZOG:

Yes, Carol Bruch.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: They rejected that because of the
absence of uniformity. Any problem in not having a formula is
that in San Diego they
that concept more restrictively or
more generously
Sacramento. How would you deal
l;vith that?
MS HERZOG: That s true and even in an individual
jurisdiction, Orange County for example, some judges might go one
way and some the other way
That's always the problem, and I
think that is one of the motivations behind the hard and fast
rules that are in
Family Law Act, that at the time that Act
was passed, there was a substantial feeling that they couldn't
trust the judges to be consistent, "so we aren't going to give
them any discretion at all." I'm not sure that the cure isn't
worse than the disease.
It's very difficult for me to evaluate
that particular problem.
Let me say one other thing in regard •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: Let me say this so I can
what you're saying. What you're saying is that, on
balance, you would take some disparity in how that concept of
broadening spousal support was applied as opposed to some strict
formula which would have some percentage .•.
underst~nd

MS. HERZOG:
I
think there is a strict formula
that can do justice
case, and I do think you have to
have some ability of the courts to use the
common sense, their
sense of justice to
ust things.
CONNELLY: Let me just get your comment on
the Law Revision Commission's recommendation on the refund or t.he
repayment
the cost
;._ssE~1BLYJII!..AN

MS. HERZOG:
ASSEMBLY~.A.N

Do you see
formula or problem?

CONNELLY:
s

essentially their formula.
lication of that

MS. HERZOG: Well, I see potential inequities, yes, in
any formula to determine
value because of the i!ldividual
situation of people. This formula is based on national
statistics and
that is
on a statistical average
may or may not f
an individual case. I'm thinking about people
who for one reason or another, the lawyer who in his last year of
school has an automobile accident and can't talk anymore because
he stutters too badly. There are always individual cases. There
fl.re always individual situations. There is the Mormon who passes
his medical exams and decides to do three years of volunteer
work. Here we
the
doctor situation. I am not in
favor of something
res
to go out and get the
maximum earnings.
~15

Another reason that I think that you ought to explore
the spousal support end of it -- and I must say that other states
have handled this problem with what they call "alimony in gross"
that is, a lump sum figure, but it's also termed "alimony."
The problem with a property division solution is that,
particularly at the end of the schooling, the student is in a
marvelous position to file bankruptcy and discharge that
obligation. Spousal support, however, is not dischargable in
bankruptcy so that is another consideration.
I can see that, if
the Supreme Court comes in with a formula based on the difference
in earnings as the way to evaluate the doctor's degree, there's
going to be a new course in how to get out of paying your wife
anything for your degree. They're going to give that as a senior
course, and they're going to teach them how to file their own
bankruptcies. Mark Sullivan could have filed bankruptcy at that
point. They had nothing. They had not accumulated in their ten
years of marriage. They hadn't accumulated anything. So I think
that that's a consideration too.
Enforcement of spousal support is always difficult and,
of course, enforcement of any debt is difficult, but I don't
think that is within your ability to correct.
I think that's
just part of our society. Any other questions?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
McAlister?

Yes.

Did you have any questions, Mr.

ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER:
Professor Bruch has suggested a
somewhat different approach. Although she's b?sically
sympathetic with what we're trying to do, she suggested an
approach in which the relief would be called "lump sum spousal
support," in an attempt to avoid the bankruptcy problem.

MS. HERZOG:

That is just what I said.

ASSEHBLYMAN McALISTER: That is a serious problem that I
think we no have to address because we certainly don't want
someone to be able to wipe out all of his obligation by filing
bankruptcy.
There's a problem, though, that I think all the
wi t.nesses, especially those who are dubious about my bill, really
ought to address themselves to, and that is, and Ms. Herzog has
stressed the need for, flexibility by the courts. Normally, I
agree with that, except that here we have a pattern of fifty or a
hundred or two hundred or however many years of divorce law in
which that ~J.exibility has led to, in 80 percent of the cases or
more, women getting it in the neck, '~i th snpport orders that are
inadequate and with support enforcement procedures that are
tragic. Now, what gu~rantee do we have with this, in concept,
beautiful idea of flexibility is going to work any better in the
future with any new scheme than it's worked in the past?
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ever.
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s La.w.
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to work this
the past, where

What makes us
flexibility
in the past it

MS. HERZOG:
I
are some protections still
available in the Fami
stantial, equal division
and so forth and so on
, possib , if the court
could work out a
form
for spousal support and child
support, it wou
as much to re
the problems of women and
children in this state as anything they could do.
A
of both parties
and then
sian that would be more equitable
than "How much
s woman need to
survive?" would be
an enormous assistance to people.
ASSEMBLYMAN HcALISTER:
understand, now do have ..•

Some of the counties, I

of a suggested schedule.
the state, and those are only
anywhere.
I think that even a
somebody can determine that, if
're
the shaft.

But it's
guidelines.
legislative
they get 15

in Orange County,
right?
MS. HERZOG
Does

ASSEMBLYr<!AN

County have such a

schedu
MS. HERZOG:

No.
have such a

schedule
don't practice in San

MS. HERZOG
Dieqo.
Do

practice in any counties

that do
Orange County.
because there are a
st to practice where

~1S.

Domestic re
lot of emot
you know the
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CHlURMAN HARRIS: As a matter of fact, we are working in
that vein, trying to come up with some kind of statewide
standard. You might take a look at Assemblyman Art Agnes's bill
[AB 1527] •

MS. HERZOG:
you could know.

I think that would be very helpful so that

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We're using Santa Clara County's
standard as a guide in the legislation that we're pursuing at
this point. Assemblyman Agnes's bill is currently alive.
I
don't know how well it is doing.
MS. HERZOG:
I'm not familiar with those standards.
Whether I would think they were adequate, I don't know.
CHAIRMAN
also looking into
there're a lot of
changes. This is

HARRIS: You may want to look at it. We're
automatic cost of living adjustments too so
things that we're trying to do to make some
one of them.

MS. HERZOG:
I think cost of living adjustments would
also help a lot.
It would keep people from having to go back
into court and take the court's time and spend their money in
that regard.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
That's right. Thank you very much.
Your testimony has been more than helpful. Thank you.
MS. HERZOG:

Thank you.

MS. ELWELL:

Mr. Chairman, could I ask her one question?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No. You can talk to her outside
though. When you get in the r,egislature, you can sit up here
like us and act crazy. (Laughter)
The next witness will be Mr. Fred Hiestand.
MR. FRED J. HIESTAND:
Thank you, Mr. Harris and members
of the Committee.
It's always a pleasure to come to San Diego.
I originally became involved with this problem on behalf
of the California Medical Association, which asked that I do an
amicus brief, the thrust of which was to say to the Court, "You
should not try to repair this inequity because bad cases make for
bad law, or hard cases make for bad law, but instead you should
leave it for the Legislature to do so." Then Mr. McAlister
responded with his bill, and you're apparently considering doing
so.
I don't really know how much I have to say that isn't
already adequately given to you by your consultant in the
analysis in terms of raising questions.
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But the examples

that have been used, especially in the briefing on this case by
the parties that would have the court put a value on it, I
suggest argue as much for not putting a value on it. The
examples that are used are that, for instance, we place values on
pain and suffering.
This Cmnmittee knows, from
s consideration of bills in
the tort reform area over the past few years, what that has led
to. It has led to what Justice Roger Traynor said twenty-five
years ago in his dissent in the Seffert case was a situation that
we could not tolerate for long because we would be trying to
spread the loss through the cost of goods and services in a way
that all of us could ill afford after a time. Pain and suffering
is quite subjective and, as this Committee knows, it was so
subjective during the medical malpractice crisis that the
Legislature decided to cap it at $250,000; that's all the pain
and suffering that they thought a person was worth getting
compensat.ed for in medical malpractice.
One other time in the history of civil legislation, the
Legislature decided in defamation actions (when you're suing a
broadcaster or publisher), if there's an opportunity for
retraction that is given that there can be no pain and suffering
damages, no noneconomic losses whatsoever recovered. So that
again shows that there has been recognition that pain and
suffering is not something that you should necessarily try to
place a value on in all situations.
In the case of Turpin (the wrongful life case) , where a
baby was horn defective and they felt tha~ the doctor, by not
giving adequate information to the pnrents that would have
resulted in perhaps an abortion that would have saved the child
from having those defects, should pay damages for the rest of
that child's life, the California Supreme Court itself said,
"Medical care, yes; but pain and suffering, no. We have to draw
the line somewhere." If
and suffering is to be used as an
example for how you can put a value on a medical education or
legal education or whatever, I suggest it argues as much the
other way as it does for placing a value on it.
Unvest.ed contingent
ion rights was another example
of something that the Cali
a courts have placed a value on.
It's argued that therefore we can place a value on the medical
degree by analogy. But precise
se the California courts
have done that, the courts of other states v1here they have not
done that have reached instead to the medical and legal degrees.
I suggest that they
done so because they have already ruled
that they are not goina to place a value on the unvested
con~ingent pension benefits.
So,
ng eliminated that as one
of the sources of cornmuni ty
they might divide, they have
then looked over to thi s
as a
ical and a legal degree,
and then that's cited as precedent for California as to why we
should move over
that same direction also.
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McALISTER

MR. HIESTAND:

.

common o

prejudice, sir.

extent these were divorces

. to

with ...
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
If statistics mean anything to
you, and
that anybody seriously questions
the main
so
's
survey, those
male complaints are mo
f
Now there, of course,
will be individual s
could be justified. I
think what happens,
female, in many divorces
it's a very bitter thing. Of course, regardless, whether a law
is no-fault or not, in human relations we tend to stress fault,
and if one thinks
because of the fault of
the other spouse,
s to think the other
spouse should
MR. HIESTAND: Yes,
e
was supposed to be
eliminated with the enactment of no-fault divorce.
Yes, I know it, but that's why
out economically better, are
to them.

most men, even
<JOing to feel
MR. HIESTAND:
se \vere
know
attorneys?
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ssor Weitzman's study, do you
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1 cases
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, of cases.
I think
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brought in other studies
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ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: If you find a
and vdfe
who are worth ten million dollars and it's all community property
and it's going to be divided, sure. Who wou
' t want to
represent the
cAse? How
are
that?
MR
ten million

It

sn't

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:

A

to
1

close to
, half

MR. HIESTAND:
It's just that
property, I think
le
1 that community
the eaual division
are pretty
le.
have community property,
's
le.
disaster.
you're in a
property, it's an economic
saster,
to that marriage has some ability, whether
education or natural ability, they will
better
than the other.

1

communi
laws and
When yon don't
It is an economic
s without

ASSEMBLY.f;I!J\N McALISTER: Our major
, though, goes
back to our definition of what is property. The major asset that
most people
is not ten million dollars of
Oil
stock. It is
earning capacity of one or both of the spouses.
That's thP major asset that most people have.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I don't think there's
question
about that, Mr. McAlister. You reduced it to that argument
before.
you would

Mr. Hiestand, do you have anything else
like to add?
MR. HIESTAND:

I have nothing else

1

I

to

add.
(To Assemblyman Connel

):

Do you have

any que
All

, Mr. Connelly has no que

Mr. Hiestand, thank you.
MR. HIESTAND:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We appreciate

testimony.

Kathleen Eggleston.
MS. KATHLEEN A. EGGLESTON:
statement that I will submit for the
make some points.
[Appendix B]
I would
just the issue of "How do we divide
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MS. EGGLESTON: Mr. McAlister,
something
to you.
I am not synonymous, because of my
, with the
word "family." A family takes two people.
it takes a wi
and it takes two
child's best interests. Now, what that means
we're talking about are not spousal
he gets me. What we're talking about is,
"little daddy," getting some of the "big
structural changes \'lhich don't a.llow me as a
to put
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you're
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as a woman to him
as a man.
ASSE:f-1BLYMAN McALISTER:
You haven 1 t eve:r.
an attempt
to answer my question, so let me ask you another
stion.
How
long do you think these structural changes are go ng to take?
MS. EGGLESTON:
I don't have the vaguest
as long as it will take to get some husbands to
their lives to women.
ASSEMBLY~illN McALISTER:
You expect
happen in the lives of anyone in this room?

Probably
half of
s going to

MS. EGGLESTON:
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I'm sorry.
I will go back and try to answer
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It may
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But, as it is right now,
look
at the women and the children.
of
The whole concept of the "tender
women were
women getting the children -- in Victorian
women and
never awarded the
ldren. This was on
the children out of the labor market. There was a time when R
his
fe,
man had the right to
s children, and if
she maybe went back to her mother, but he
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
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heard an alleged feminist extolling Victorian
MS. EGGLESTON:
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I've ever
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humnnist.
ASSEMBLYJviAN McALISTER: Whatever you are, I 1 ve never
heard anybody extolling Victorian times
al
fact that
they did not give custody of the children to
women.
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far
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concept.
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY:

Is

award?

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER

calls it
I

property asset.
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think, as
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MR. CRANSTON:
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CHAIRl"'AN HARRIS:

Thank you, Mr. Cranston.
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ss

Mr.
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This variation of earning capacity, rather than taking just one
part of it and legislating to deal with that, the part that's
easiestly quantifiable really ought to
of a
equitable evaluation.
Alister's formula is, I think,
We veta
about that and arm wrestl
He hasn't
me
haven't persuaded him. Something bothers me about
this
little piece of it when that ought to be a piece considered a
part of the whole in terms of this earning capacity
ation.
MR. STERLING: Yes, I understand what you're saying.
Basically, the Cormnission felt, as you said, this was an easy one
to address that could be cured. Let's do
now, and worry
about the rest later.
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER:
Nat,
Commission's proposal is for the wife
is the underlying assumption that she
some money or somethinq of that kind,

MR. STERLING:

do I understand the
to be compensated? There
has worked and contributed
right?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Now, what about the
fe who
hasn't worked.
I mean, does she owe the husband money then?
MR. STERLING: No. The concept is, i.f there have been
community assets that have been contributed to one spouse's
education, the community gets reimbur
so
sn't matter
where that cornmuni ty property came from.
It could be from the
wife's earnings. That's the typical case we're thinking of, but
it could be from the husband's earnings too. Who knows where the
community assets have come from? But
fact is t.he
has been depleted for the benefit of one spouse and
proper to have the co~munity be reimbur
for that
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER:
Well, take the case
re the
wife did not work out of the home. She stayed in the home, took
care of the children, did whatever she did. The husband went to
school and got an education. Does your bill apply to that
situation?

MR. STERLING:

Yes.

McALISTER:
your bill cause to happen?
ASSEMBLY~..AN

I-1.R.

STERLING:

What will hc,ppen?

What will

There are no community aBsets

that

situation?
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER:
Take a case, I guess, kind of
like the Sullivan case, where there's litt
of what we call, at
least in the traditional sense, "community assets"...
re the
husband gets a doctor's degree, but the wife didn't work out of
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see -- we're not sure

ASSEMBLY~~N

McALISTER: Would you mind telling me just
how you think you're going to live with this? Say, the Supreme
Court renders the relief that Mrs. Sullivan is asking for.
MR. HUNTINGTON:
If they do, we'
live with it. We'll
have to. We don't have much of an option.
I don't get to
testify in front of the Supreme Court.
I do here.
ASSEMBLY~.AN McALISTER:
Yes. But I assume that yon feel
that their decision in favor of her would be a disaster on a par
with the passage of this bill?

MR. HUNTINGTON:
I hope they don' t come down
decision that goes in that direction.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
just wondered.

~·lith

a

No one knows \vhat they' 11

I

MR. HUNTINGTON: They've had it for close to a year now
so they may never come down with the decision.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
I guess that your testimony kind
of reflects -- to sum up your testimony, your letter states, "On
balance there is no wide spread evil, either real or perceived,
that needs a cure. You're using a bazooka to kill a gnat. The
evil perceived is that on occasion a doctor or lawyer obtains an
education at the expense of his or her spouse."
[Appendix D)
I
~!lender, have you read Lenore Weitzman's study?
MR. HUNTINGTON:
ASSEMBLY~.AN

I've never heard of Lenore Weitzman.

McALISTER:

MR. HUNTINGTON:

You've never heard of her?

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
reflects your ignorance.

Well, your testimony certainly

MR. HUNTINGTON:
Sir, I doubt if Lenore Weitzman's ever
read any of my articles either.
(Laughter)
ASSEt1BLY:t4AN McALISTER:

What have your articles

about?
MR. HUNTINGTON: Tax law, divorce tax law, divorce
taxation, valuation of community assets in a divorce case.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Have they dealt with the
economic plight that the wife faces on divorce?
MR. HUNTINGTON:
I have never written anything on that
specific subject.
I've lectured for the University of
California, Continuing Education ...
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I've probably
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wou
1
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s reasonably calculable,
some bearing
marriage itself.
on an illusory,
percentage of
ability." For example, we don't
plan to be a career asset.
It's 8. piece of
on compensat
work performed

use

or

ssed by
me. The
sa
is that the
ted specifically to
and books.
I think that
up Pandora's box for
c. cutoff date, I
ssed.
I wou
think
example, if you
a law degree
the cutoff
, why not
a cutoff
This
~ore us now has no cutoff
of any kind so we
st dol ars could be considered and would be
concerns about AB 525 as practicing attorneys are,
enormous cost to the cl
s and an enormous cost
itse f.
We have a dissolution time study
you. You wanted
s earlier. There's a
that shows the extra costs that we now have
o~ us not only by the Sullivan legislation
that may come down but also by our local
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courts in requiring
often are unnecessary, to go through
that don't matter to you people here.
thirteen hours of additional lawyer
hundred dollars to two hundred dol
These add enormous costs to clients,
benefit.
I will guarantee ~hat you
hire expert witnesses on both sides. You
have hired guns on both sides, and you're
it virtually in any kind of a case you
lavryer, after Smith v. Lewis came down ten
right mind would try a ~ase without
as to some theoretical enhancement

ss

I think the thing that 1
my letter is the fact of my own
roughly twenty-one years. We started out
wife through her last year in college.
She's never cooked professionally since
me through three years of law school whi
she was a
for the welfare department in San Francisco.
apartment house manager and learned how to
apartment house manager. Then she
master's degree in tax law.
I supported
master's degree in social work.
I've gone
seventy-five CEB seminars, and if you can sort
this bill, more power to you, but I think
expert witnesses will be the ones that
only limit2tion on this bill is the
lawyer.

The fact is
San Diego,
are tried under what we call a "
or less.
If you have a three-hour-ortrjal and resolve your case for the
inside of five months.
If you expand
is roughly four to five hours of trial
at ten months to trial.
If you throw
of this, then you're going to a two day
roughly twenty months to trial, and we
fastest counties in the state of Cali
Angeles, I suspect you're talking
throw the Sullivan testimony on top of
tuned.

The system down here is working.
Why overwhelm it?

ASSEr-1BLYMAN McALISTER:
I'm just
t.Pstimony I'm hearing from lawyers here
the last statement this gentleman made
£.ystem here is working. Why fool with
If the lawyers of our state or their
believe this system is working, they've
just incredible.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
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f equitable
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It has
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, status of
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a whole numb~~r of
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lem
.l>,SSEMBLY:t-1AN CONNELLY:
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the equation.
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under concept of
re's the other part of
Ms. Herzog and
some of the articles
say that there ought
relying upon need
1 that takes into
red during the course

MR. HUNTINGTON: My understanding of Section 4801 is
that capacity to earn and standard of living kind of go hand in
hand and already exist.
In a situation where you have a
nonworking wife and a substantially ~arning husband, that's going
to be taken care of by the concept of alimony. What if she
remarries, then alimony terminates and it
sn't
on
like this hill seemingly does.
I think the concept of alimony
addresses the problem.
ASSEMBLY~~N

CONNELLY:

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. HUNTINGTON:
CHAI~!AN

HARRIS:

Thank you.

Are you from San Diego?
Yes, sir.
Do you live

~'.s.

Mojonn.ier's

C.istrict?
MR. HUNTINGTON:
CHAI~~N

same school.

HARRIS:
(Laughter)

HR.HUNTINGTON:

No, I don't believe so.
Oh, it seems like you two went to the
We studied under the same master.

CHAIP~N HARRIS:
I see. Well, I'm looking forward to
when you and Ms. Eggleston find an issue that you disagree on.
Wr~ \·lant to have a stimulating debate.
We' 11 come back to San
Diego for it.
(Laughter)

MR.HUNTINGTON:
CHAIRP~N HARRIS~

MR.HUNTINGTON:
CHJl.~IRMAN

HARRIS

I enjoyed her testimony.
Yes, and I enjoyed yours.

Thank you.

Thank you.
(To the Co:ro.mi ttee) :

Anybody else have

0.ny questionn?
welcome.

Our next witness will be Mr. Andrew Wagner. Mr. Wagner,
Would you introduce yourself and who you represent?

HP. ANDREW G. WAGNER: Thank you. My name is Andrew
Wagner, I'm the [in~coming] Chairman of the Family Law
Specialists Advisory Committee of the San Diego County Bar
Association.
I'm also an adjunct professor of family law and
have been for the past fifteen years.
I'm here, first, to give
the opinior. of the family law specic;_lists as to this particular
bill. We oppose it.
I find myself standing in splendid isolation with all
the other lawyers who have spoken today ...
CHAI~.N

HARRIS:

~1r.

McAlister's going to love you.
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ASSEMBLY~~N

to say.

McALISTER:

I

to

what he's going

(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

MR. WAGNER:
the lawyers have said;
I might want to add to it.
have actually r8ad the art

(Laughter)

He

rtually everything
of additions that
' I
Unlike some
other people, I
les that
've referred to.

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
lawyer who is actually an intel
his field!

le!
(Laughter)
bothers to study

A

WAGNER:
with
in
1977
them.
(Laughter) .
I cons
I
cons
r
a
study
which
have little or no application
is a random sa.rople of court.
to he not indicative of the
variations that enter into any disso
ion proceedings.
Therefore, I question them.
l\fR.

ASSEMBLY¥illN McALISTER:
make a difference?

What's happened in six years to

HR. WAGNER:
I would commend to
Co:mmi t tee two cases:
Brown v. Brown and another case called Brantner, written by a
judge by the name of Gardner in the Fourth District.
I think,
more than
case that I've ever
read in my whole li , the Brantner case brings succinctly to
focus what is the sublimina
ssue of
s going on today, and
that is the discussion of discarded
Judge Gardner in very
poetic language describes them as "
mares" who after their
fecundity are put out to pasture.
In doing so, he is discussing
the very issue that you've raised called "spou
support," and I
commend it to you.
I commend it to
because
's an
indicatioc of enlightened reasoning and it's also an indication
of how creatively spousal support can
used.
I also recommend that the people here read Section 4801,
which is the spousal support code section and that they read it
cation, it can
with great care. Because
sl
, this Committee wishes
fulfill the exact desires that, I bel
to have fulfilled.
It is my opinion and it is the opinion of my committee
thilt to create a species of property that is dependent upon two
rather ephemeral concepts is to create a situation which will
guarantee that lawyers become richPr and litigants become poorer.
It will alsc guarantee that we will create, as Ned pointed out,
new experts.
It will also enhance the income of accountants,
economists, actuaries, physicians (because I think we have to
make determinations about the health of the people in order to
qualify the amount that we're talking about). And certainly
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we'll have psychiatrists who will come
psychiatric impact of this whole
economic advantage, I
'ltle all
litigants.
There were
i
which I attempted to answer.
that I had attended the wrong
posed were, number one, should career
property? No.
I took
upon
lf
was to look up the two words in
"A field for or pursuit of
especially, in public, professional,
Secondary definition:
"A profession
"Asset":
"The entire property of all
to the payment of his debts."
"Career asset" is an
It is also a question as to what we
the concept in legislation. What
actually do use this term, what
include any training that occurs
any advancement cue to activity or e
longevity? If so, what limits do we app
limit that which is ~egitimate training out
category of the particular employee? How
input do we use? To use the old
computers, "garbage
Bill, scholarships,
part-time work? Are
upon them because of the other's
consideration that should be used?
I've heard people talk about
concepts that deal with intangib
rights, and the other, good will.
comparison at all. Good
11 is a
concept that has been in existence
The fact that good will is applied to
divorce is indicative of the flexibil
so far as defining community property
professionals, particularly lawyers,
salable co~~odity.
I, again,
1 that
characterize it as property and we
characterize it as cow~unity property.
I think part of the confus
we quite frequently use the word
saying "standing to sue" because we
only those people who have property
a law suit, as opposed to those
inchoate, unvested, or expectanc
use not only those labels, but we
vested" and "unvested" in trying to
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I agree
recommendations of
it does not go
does not mean I
inequity, because I feel
inequity can be reso
Section 4801.
I
door this state into
"equitable distribution state."
we determined that we would
state.
If we now feel that
approaching things,
I
instead of trying to
distinguish, if not

think
bill

say so

, I cannot
becomes
it is
absence of
a determinant

LaBtly, if
perceive any relevancy
property only because
property, or
isn't
children, in my limited
of what is property or

made are, I think,
C
1 Code can be
The section
each spouse,
spouse's
of
to permit the
A sentence
, and words such
the education

Specific sugge
s
that subsection one of Section
amended by language which
as it presently reads is "
taking into account the extent
present and future
unemployment that were
supported spouse to devote
could be added, or a comma
as this, but not neces
of the other spouse."
Subsection s
spouse to acquire appropriate
employment." If I under
ensure t~at one person does not
while the other suffers, and I
specifically devoted to that

supported
, and
11, it is to
and education

Subsection e
has already been addressed
power to do anything
factors which it deems just and
expanded to define
i
cal
under the circumstances.

of the parties,
the court the
, "Any other
That section can be
just and equitable

Lastly,
the court has the power to award a
to compensate the pa
for
need.
Subsection {b) ta
terminability of spousal
writing to alter that.
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to indicate that
alimony in gross
to be this
fiablility and
ili
of parties in

I suggest that, if we are really
to
ust
this situation, that an amendment of that, giving the power of
the court in this limited arena to create a
f
nonterminable support to compensate for
would
an
equitable way of proceeding.
It's es
s
set
forth in the letter provided you by
escapes me at the very moment.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
IY!R. WAGNER:

Professor Bruch

Thank you .

Last 1 y ..•

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
I think she
beyond that. You're a moving in the right
she goes a good deal further than that.

1
~.

nk

I

~1F.. WAGNER:
I agree she does.
I m not sure I want to
far
as
she
does,
but
I
do
agree
with
the
go as
of alimony
in gross.

I think the concept of whether or
should be tax
deductible or tax includable is a question
">ve have to
make a determination. Are we dealing
, or are we
dealing with support? The difference between the two is often
very hard to distinguish.

Lastly, I can only make this other statement to the
C0mmittee. It is virtually the unanimous
law certified specialists of San Diego
passed.
It is also our recommendation
consider modifications of Section 4801,
I've
suggested, but perhaps as the way to
Th
you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
question, Mr. Connelly?
ASSEMBLY~~N

Thank you

CONNELLY:

Do

a

Yes, sir.

(To Mr. Wagner) You had indicated
the Law Revision Co:mmission' s recommendat
altereo.
I wondered what alteration
propose in that?

vmuld

MR. WAGNER: No.
I felt that the Law
s
Commission didn't go far enough. Their recommendation simply is
a statement in which they are saying that
should be
reimbursed for monies paid out.
I think
only
addresses the problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: So your
is
the
Section 4801 expansion that you've identif
wou
be an
addition to the Law Revision Commission's recomiDendation?
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CHAIR.tvl.A,N HARRIS:
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Mr.
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Are there
much, Mr. Wagner.
You
.A.ll right,
Diego chapter c:f NOW.
MS. LENORE LOWE:
represent San Diego
members of the Cali
a
would like to thank all o
I feel that ce
this

It's intere
on the list that, I
hand, you have the
On the other hand, all
looking at our watches
spent here debating an
enough to qo on for
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fcm
the women who are
is passed have been
mares," have also
the cleaners,"and have
meal ticket."
I don't
women who would be af
if I did I would
qualifications about

We've also
that there is a prob
seemed to me some confus
there was a problem.
bazooka gun at a gnat
this body needs to be
audience who may think
three adults living in
that, by all projections,
nearly 100 percent of
be women and their ch
remainr~ that we
By the State
study by the chair of
Vasconcellos, the s

very
San
and I not only
sand
I

near the last.
On the one
has said.
seats and
have been
complicated
is that
not AB 525
"breed
ses to
for a
the

agreement
, there
all agreed
erms was "a
ffect.
I think that
those in the
that two out of
are women and
ll find that
level will
there, the fact
outlined in a
Committee, John
decreases by

73 percent for a woman.
The standard
increases by 42 percent after divorce
have a lot at stake here if in fact we
"career assets."
I think
heard from many men and also
that we shouldn't enact
lose, I wouldn't want this
Many factors contribute to
there are two major factors that we
divorce.
It skews this picture, as
Legislature's own sturly. Women who
and their career development in order
community find themselves in an
Not all women have opterl to do tha~ or
whatever you might call
~-1any women
were forced into that role because of
We know that when a man divorces he
often when a woman divorces she become
is faced with a unique need to
for her children because we also know that
awarded in 40 percent of the cases
v1here it is awarded it's less than two
We also know that alimony is only
the cases, and there's some speculation
that 15 percent is.
The second major factor
women is our earning potential.
women earn only fifty-nine cents on
earned by men.
But what you might
earn on an average only ten thousand
men earn twenty-five thousanc1 dollars
woman with a college education will not
time as a man with an eighth grade
economic inequities that are
must address.
ASSEMBLY~~N CONNELLY:
Ms. Lowe
specific legislative recommendations that

MS. LOWE:

I'll be brief.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY:

Thank

.MS. LOWE:
85 percent of the women in this
end up supporting themselves, and I
that. We did speak about all of these
into the labor market and doing these
I would point out to you that Assemb
of two women to go to the State Assemb
San Diego.
The gains that we're making
until such time that women can support
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children above the poverty level, which a moderate income would
be twenty-five thousand dollars a year, which puts women fifteen
thousand dollars under that level, we do need to reach some
agreement in how to provide for these women.
CHlURMAN HARRIS:
Let me
to
testimony. Are you in favor of A.B 525 as
MS. LOWE: We are concerned about AB 525 as written for
a number of reasons that have also been described here today.
For example, we are not clear on vvhy
s would apply only to
people who have children. We also feel that Professor Bruch has
taken a great deal of energy and time to put forth something that
may be more workable and certainly more passable in the State
Legislature.
I think at the bottom of all of this is that we must
reach a compromise behveen what is here as written and what
Professor Bruch and others have put forth because, if we don't,
we're going to continue to displace people into poverty, but most
of those people are women. The dissolution of a partnership must
not be allowed to place either spouse in poverty while the other
continuPs to benefit and flourish from career assets or earning
potential established in the partnership wi_
a community.
I'm sure that the women that were here today would tell
you that what they put in in terms of caring for their children,
in terms of making it easier for one spouse to work in the job
market, must be compensated.
I know as well as
of you that,
if we all had a wife at home, we would be able to go just that
much fa~ther because someone has to do the laundry and someone
has to raise the kids and someone has to prepare the meals.
I
think that it's about time that we recognize that women largely,
or the spouse that is the homemaker, must be compensated
equi ta.bly.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Let me interrupt you to ask a few
questions. First of all, I guess to some extent going back to
Ms. Eggleston's argument, there are obviously changes in
society ...
MS. LOWE:

Certainly.

CHAIRrvlAN HARRIS:
... and women's roles are changing, I
think, purposP.fully so that they do not. simply want to be
homemakers who will be waiting at home to wash the clothes and
nurse the children. Obviously, there're more and more working
women and more and more families where both parents Are in fact
working.
We're talking about putting into the law a change by
virtue of AB 525 that is going to be theoretically into
perpetuity. We're changing public policy to indicate that, in
fact any spouse, whether it's male or female, should be benefited
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by the contribution, made to the other
se
of a marriage as it relates to future earnings.
concerned with the total impact that this is
it going to be fair to both spouses, and is
in the long run and not just to deal with some
or a minority of cases that may be just of
sensibilities?

course
So v.1e ' re rea
to have
Is
to

~IS. LO'VJE:
I think, when two-thi
women, it's not a minority of the cases.
to look at ••.
CHAI~iAN HARRIS:
No, I'm talking
the cases as it relates to spousal support a
future earnings.

MS. LOWE: Okay, but if you talk
-- I mean -- if women are only making on an
thousand dollars a year, average, their li
less than the men so •••
CHAIR}1AN HARRIS:
out of a marriage.

I understand

is
, but

MS. LOWE: Yes, it is, but what I'm
when you're addressing something like this
need to look at is simply the earnings.
If
earnings are substantially more than the
's
perhaps that should apply to her.
In most cases,
happen.
I think what we need to look at as I
compromise, perhaps on the basis of Professor
that we don't run into the same kinds of
some difficulty with termination of a marr
dissolution of a marriage. We need to
things, but in reality it's not a few cases.
CHAIR}1AN HARRIS:

No, I'm saying a

or

's

is

case

MS. LOWE: \\fe' re talking about most 'l.vomen
substandard levels.
CHAI~AN HARRIS:
Let me make sure
I'm saying.
I'm saying a few cases that
sensibilities. There are some cases
anyone would say,
"Look, that's just not right." This woman or this man
sacrificed, went through all of these changes, and then as a
result of the one spouse who is just, as Mr
ister
a scoundrel •..

in only
alimony
out and
getting

MS. LOWE: But I don't see how that can
15 percent of all dissolutions
re's an awa
anyway. We're not talking about all of
getting a divorce and 100 percent or 90
alimony.
It's a very small percentage,
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case
of
go
of

women collecting alimony is even less than that.
It's not even
at a liveable wage or even a wage so that they can get
retraining.
Everything aside
was
today, the
is
that women are ~uffering because it's women
are in the
inferior economic position, anc we have to do something about
that ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. LOWE:
comments?

•

I understand ••.

••• and, reach a compromise in legislation.

CHAIRlv1AN HARRIS:
Any questions?

All right.
Thank you.
~'lr. McAlister?

ASSEMBLYMAN McA.LISTER:
(To Ms. Lowe)

Any other

No, I don 1 t have any

stions.

Thank you for your fine testimony.

CHAIR~~N HARRIS:
AJl right. There are two witnesses
who will not be here.
One is Mr. Morris Sorenson, an attorney,
who was not able to be here because of a conflict. He is Dr.
Sullivan's attorney.
The other is the representative from the
T:lomen Lawyers 1 Association of Los Angeles who had also intended
to testify but will not be present.

Now, we will accept very brief testimony from the
audience, anyone who would like to ado to the record.
If you
would like to make extended remarks, we will in fact receive
those for the review of the Committee and for the preparation of
the transcript of the hearing.
I don't have any prescribed
order, but if people will be courteous we wi.ll attempt to hear
all of them.
I don't anticipate it to be more than two or three.
We do not want to hear anyone who has already testified.
If you
h~ve questions or if you have additional information that you
would like to submit, we can extend the remarks that were made
orally earlier during the testimony. We will hear any witness
from the audience who would like to testify.
Introduce yourself for the record, ane, if you're
representing an organization, also state that.
MS. HEATHER SAVILLE-HYDE: Mr. Chairman and members of
the Committee, I'm Heather Saville-Hyde, a recently divorced
homemaker.
What I find interesting is that we are so poorly
represented here, that we have heard, virtually no evidence at
all from divorced women.
I was divorced after a thirty year
marriage, and I'm here to present a case for AB 525.
I would
like to see this Cormnittee hear the testimony from more divorced
women before they make their determination.
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The pressure on government resources of
feminization
of poverty has at last forced an awareness of the appalling
financial plight of women and children n
Different groups have offered different
Legal groups have recommended marriage
spousal support. Grass roots groups
I
should like to deal briefly with all
I would like to start with marriage contracts.
is
certainly a place for marriage contracts
or during
marriage, where a man or woman perce
s
c 1 or other
circumstances which dictate special protection or where the
intentions of career partners create a
1 need.
But more
marriage contracts are not the Measure
masses
whom
general blanket protection must be
For most roarrying couples,
represent an unnecessary expense at a
jll
aftord it, when they are young with minimal
l resources
already being tapped to the hilt. Marriage contracts are a
device that the young are not experienced enough to handle. With
marriage needs and priorities not yet establi
, indeed,
exposure to the world at large scarce
couples
would be ill equipped to judge where,
whom
protection was needed. With the aura
theM at this time, they might make poor
omission. The less experienced might
Marriage contracts at the outset o
emotionally disturbing. The very
odds with the sense of commitment to an
that most marrying couples start with.
contracts will probably not be entered

are
irreconcilable
life together
s reason, marriage

Let us not overlook that marr
business venture.
It's an emotional
Without protective law, the bulk of women
as
exploited as they are today. Cons
, too
nightmare at the end when, instead of one
is
contracts to be
established, there will be a myriad of
tigant and
dissected and adjudged at considerable cost to each
at incalculable cost to the state.
The rich and the gifted will a
have contracts drawn to meet their spec
realm of scciety has nc call for such ref
protection against exploitation is their
protection is \'lhat our lawmakers should enact

freedom to
generBl
Basic
and basic

sal
The other alternative, which is
that the
support -- at the outset, it should be
provide only
function of spousal support in divorce
for women in special circumstances, not for all women who are
that it
divorced.
In this limited milieu, there is no que
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should be increased to very more reali
ls. However, let
it not be for one moment imagined that increasing spousal support
will per se alter the come to grim economic position of the vast
majority of divorced women today.
In five cases out of six,
spousal support is simply not awarded. Straight away then, more
than 83 percent of divorced women would be total
unaffected by
any mandated increase.
Next, of the less than 17 percent that remain, the less
than 17 percent of divorced women who are awarded spousal support
and to whom any increase could conceivably apply, it must be
noted that most are awarded support for only a brief duration,
four or five years while they are so-called "rehabilitating"
themselves.
Yes, even after twenty years out of the work
the great ma~ority suffer modification to and even termination
of, their awards in time. Many are simply not paid
enforcement is often difficult and costly. Some are not actually
receiving spousal support at all but child support disguised as
spousal support, a tax maneuver to lure unwilling fathers into
contributing towards the maintenance of their offspring. Others,
again, become disqualified through remarriage which inexplicably
requires that a homemaker forfeit all further compensation for
the career that she has subordinated to the needs of prior
husband and family.
Since spousal support is reversible, any mandated
increase, be that an increase of amount or an increase of
applicability, could be liquidated at short order. Thus, most of
even the small 17 percent of women who are initial
awarded, but
for one reason or another are not receiving, spousal support
would also be unaffected or only briefly affected by any mandated
increase. The truth is that there is an almost total
lure on
the part of society today to even recognize, let alone
compensate, the homemaker for the sa.crifice of her own
independent paid career in the interest of family and society at
large.
In consequence, she is being mercilessly exploited in
divorce today on a grand scale.
It can safely be concluded that, were increased spousal
support awards instituted, few divorced women would receive any
benefit at all, and that the state would continue to support the
bulk of these women and their progeny at near poverty level while
subsidizing the ever increasing standard of living of free
vrheeling ex-husbands.
The pure mechanics of spousal support awards render this
alternative ur.availing. The most compelling reason, however, for
rejecting the solution is that the fundamental properties of
spousal support deny the principle of equal partnership, the
legal bedrock of the institution of marriage. Homemakers are
looking to implementation of the law. Specifically, they are
looking to permanent. compensation that is conunensurate with the
permanent, the irreversible retardation suffered by their careers
through the subordination by mutual agreement of their own
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separate economic interest to the interest of their spouses,
families, and the world beyond.
I have a very brief comment to make on why AB 525 would
help. It recognizes the homemaker's contr
on to the family
and society and compensates her for her career
I'm
frankly dismayed that in all the
sented today,
apart from H.r. McAlister, I have heard so
about the childrearing and nurturing role of women, about the contribution of
her homemaking skills. Is there no one present who values what
his mother or his wife represented in his or her life?
AB 525 will encourage women to make a real choice
regarding homemaking and motherhood, a choice based on the sure
knowledge that she will not be penalized for
in the end.
It
will preserve family life as we know
and
it. It will
eliminate the lottery aspect of divorce sett
It will
minimize the opportunities for career
s to manipulate their
incomes at settlement time.
It will help tc equalize credit
opportunities by creating a right v1here that was previously only
privilege and sometimes nothing at all. Above all, it will
implement the principle of community property and no-fault law.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much.
other witnesses who would like to testify?

Are there any

MS. SANDRA KARINEN: Yes. My name is Sandra Karinen,
and I'm from Davis, California. I'm one of the probably very few
civorced women here, and I'm representing myself but, I imagine,
quite a number of others.
I was married for eight years. When we were initially
married, we were both in school.
I actual
in fact was slightly
ahead of my husband in terms of completing a degree. However, my
education ceased at that point. Mine was deferred in favor of my
husband's.
I thought (found out later to the contrary) that we
had an agreemen-t~ that, when his education was completed, mine
would be completed later on. That never did occur.
I put him
through his final year of college, four years of medical school,
and three years of postgraduate training.
What were the community assets at the end? There was a
house.
I bought it. There were cars.
I bought them. There was
a retirement, my retirement hecause he had been put through
school because I had chosen to go out in the work force.
I
workeo. hard. What happened aftervmrds in terms of considerations
of his medical equipment, his vast medical library
ch I had
purchased? Wf!re they considered community property even? No.
They were considered personal property.
What's happened since then? I was emotionally,
physically beaten. I agreed to an out-of-court settlement, a
small aware of alimony brought in according to standards of the
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county in which I res
That amounted to $250.
ly
afterwards, I found out that my husband jumped into a private
practice, and is now earning around $100,000 a
He has now
continued to go on.
That small amount has just
sappeared
through litigation costs. Four years
I'm
11
litigation. When will it stop? I don't
The
beneficiaries of the current system are
I know
that, with one exception, they're gone.
I feel that perhaps there
th AB 525,
but in general I think it's trying to
problem which
desperately needs to be attacked.
I
something is better
than nothing as it currently stands. Those
that might be
the few exceptions that would find out
they
ing to be
overwhelmingly, unfairly treated through
AB 525 -I'm sure there is going to be a lawyer
through litigation and it
11 be re
I
think the time has been past due that
so I think in spite of the fact that there are a few probleros,
something desperately needs to be done.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: May I ask a que
on? This is just a
theoretical question. Did you anticipate that
might
happen 5n terms of your marriage not lasting forever?
MS. KARINEN: No, I did not.
J didn't anticipate
getting left with a child that's sjx months old, especially.
CHAIR}~N HARRIS:
Let me ask
st
What do
you think about the notion of antenuptia or prenuptial
agreements? I was just wondering whether you wou
1 with it?
In terms of just clarifying, we're trying to
gure out how to
not litigate these kinds of problems.

HS . Kl',RINEN:
I know. We 11, I
sh I had
I had an
oral agreement; it was for naught.
I was
but not that
young when I was married. You don't neces
ly think of that.
You're just not concerned with that.
You
' t find out until
harsh reality sets in. ~ lot of friends of
learned
through my unfortunate experiences.
I just didn't know, and, as
I say, unfortunately because I did accept the out-of-court
settlement my casP was bifurcated on the
issues. The
courts have deemed it necessary that from there on out I'm able
to handle my own legal costs.
CHAIRJIIIAN HARRIS: Would you be satisfied, when I'm
saying "satisfied," I mean feel made whole or, at least -- oh, I
don't know how to describe it because it's kind of difficult to
put any kind of value on these kinds of situations -- if in fact
there was some economic renumeration relative to your sacrifice?
MS. KARINEN: Yes.
I think something
to be done.
J
gave up my career. The reason he got through was he not only had
a breadwinner, he had a homemaker.
I provided meals at the
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hospital when he was going through.
took care of everything else.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You feel cheated.

MS. KARINEN: Yes.
I
school. One, I don't have the
difficult because I don't have
parent, and I'm earning money,
our legal system.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I did all kinds of things; I

would love to try and go back tn
money. Two, it would be very
a househusband. Now, I'm a single
but it's all going back right into

I understand.

MS. KARINEN:
I can't foresee when I will ever get out
of wherP I am.
I'm in a career that I did not intend to be in.
I'm boxed in.
I've gone as high as I can go.
I just can't
foresee where I can get ahead.
I can't stop to go to school
because, if I do -- I do have some retirement -- I'd be giving
that up. I really feel strongly that the courts will take care
of the other problems. If we just keep waiting and waiting and
waiting, nothing is going to be done.
It's only going to get
worse.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS

(To the

Co~mittee):

Are there any

questions
(To Ms. Karinen)

Thank you.

Are there any other witnesses who

~1ould

like to testify?

That will conclude the testimony.
I do want to
acknowledge certainly the large number of people who would be
affected by this bill. Obviously, they could not all testify.
Some could not testify because of the logistical problem of our
being in San Diego. We always have that problem whenever we try
to have a hearing in this vast state.
Certainly, anyone may send \tlri tten information, but we
really want things that. are appropriate. \ve simply don't need
people telling us their personal horror stories bec~use we
acknowledge and we stipulate that those kinds of things exist
where peopl.e have not received the benefit of their bargain as a
result of the marriage contract. We do want to try to come to
some realistic conclusions as to what is an appropriate
legislative solution, if any, to this prnblern. We therefore
welcome any jnformation that would help us in trying to reach the
solutions that Mr. McAlister's seeking with AB 525.
~r. McAlister, do you have anything that you would like
to add in closing?

ASSEMBLY:fv1AN McALISTER:
anything I have to say anyway.

Not many people are here to hear
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I mean for

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
If it's going to
for the
record, I would like to express my disappo
in the
organized bar. Of course 1 one of their
is to look at
things with a fine tooth comb and
to
what legally
could go wrong with any proposal.
I
I'm a
lawyer, and I do a lot of that myself as a
slator. It's
certainly important to analyze a proposal and find out all the
legal things that could go wrong with
But, it seemed to me
that I detected an almost total lack of sensitivity to the social
problem. Now, that doesn't mean that my
11 was the best way to
solve it if they've got a better solution, but, with the
exception of the one gentleman, I believe
s name was Wagner •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Wagner.

ASSEMBLY¥.tAN McALISTER: He, at least, partially
recognized there's a problem. The others, particularly the one
gentleman, just virtually denied the existence of a problem, and
I think that is putting on blinders.
I 1 m just appalled that members of the organized bar
could with a straight face tell us, "Well, it's not really much
of a problem and, to the extent that there is one, why a little
fine tinkering can take care of it." It's a major problem, and
to have lawyers who represent the bar come before us here and, in
the one gentleman's case, not even to
ever
of Lenore
Weitzman's study is really somewhat disappointing.
There is a profound social problem here.
solve it, if the Supreme Court doesn't so
it,
on.
It's going to fester.

If we don't
's going to go

The one gentleman who did have some suggestions
suggested that we tinker further with Section 4801. That may be
better than nothing.
I've done some of that tinkering myself
already.
One of the subsections that he referred to was put in
there largely as a result of my bill, AB 437, of a few years ago.
That's subsection one of Section 4801.
I can't tell, frankly,
from what I've learned since then that my bill really had any
great effect out there in the real world.
It was aimed at
helpir1c; the long-term house\·i.i fe who had foregone empioyment
opportunities, and I certainly haven't had anyone beating a path
to my door telling me that my bill solved all of their problems.
I think it's had a very minor, modest effect, if any.
I wish there were a little more social sensibility by
the bar as to these problems.
If they don't like my approach,
then why don't they develop one that's sounder? I might even
support it, but I don't sense that they're about to do that.
CHAIRJ.U\_N HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. McAlister.
I certainly
want to tell you that we're here because of your bill. There's
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no question in my mind that we would not be engaged in this
vigorous discussion or giving the kind of attention that we're
giving to this matter had it not been for your bill.
I'm confident that something will come out that will be
steps in the right direction, but whether or not people will be
totally satisfied, of course, is always in doubt.
I've
determined that we won't be able to satisfy everyone's concerns.
I do think, however, that we are going to look at this issue
seriously and try to come up with some solutions that will, at
least, start to deal with the social problems that Mr.
McAlister's outlined.
Thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

* * * * * *
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To whom it may concern

Page 2

November 16, 1983

stantial retirement interests, based on earnings which include those
reali
from his earning-capacity ~nCJtea;.,e gained in the operations of
our marriage partnership.
I regarded our marriage, from its outset, as an equal partnership.
So did principles of community-property law, a;., tong a;., a wa-!> bdact. ~1y
husband was enabled to concentrate on his career full time and continuously
during our marriage (and largely for three years afterward) because of my
having taken on our domestic responsibilities: responsibilities incurred
jo~ntty by, and belonging equatfy to, both of us.
I was enabled to support
hlm in tfUJ:, manner because he supported me financially. And my pJr..e..oe11ce ).n
the home wa;., ofi 110 -te..oJ.. woJr..th to the 6~y, J..ociety and poJ.:Jte.JU.ty than wa!>
YU!:, pJr..Me.11ce ~11
cMe.eJr.. Meld. My equality with him in woJr..th entitled
me, in accord with the expectation implied by our partnership, to share
with him on an e.quat ba;.,).J.; whatever economic benefits -- whether acquired
or
-- were generated by the opeJr..atiol1'-> of the partnership. The
post-divorce earnings realized as a result of his earning-capacity ~nCJtea.-je
an increase gained ~n the c.ontext o6 the Jr..e..opoM~bilitie..o o6 oUJr.. ma-'t- are
benefits of those operations.
It might be said that my half of the interests in the increase was
earned during
f of my husband's workday: the half released to him, in
accord with our mutually agreed-upon arrangement, by my taking on ~~ half
of our jointly incurred domestic responsibilities during that time -while I was not pursuing a paying career of my own.
I am angry over the hypocrisy of law that retrospectively de~e..o the
of my
with that of my husband.
. . . angry over having
equal
been
in retroactive ~rtde.ntUJr..e.d J.J~'tv~tude to him for the duration of
our marria
(and largely so for three years afterward).
. . . angry
ng been
reed into the position of a beggar in the courts .
over
. . . angry over the put-down implicit in the courts' treatment of me
r law that is .ouppMed to treat the two parties to a divorce as having
had equal worth and dignity throughout their marriage, with no fault
charged to
party, but which has treated me as though I had been
the culprit. And I am angry that millions of other women have been treated
with the same
nd of injustice -- in short, expto~ted!
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spouses
AlL TOO OFTEN our laws are framed
without
to fundamental
only according to how they can manipulate
Not so with
Bill
<McAlister) authored
McAlister, D-San Jose, the
follow:
e The woman a man marries is presumed
worthy with himself; otherhe would not have chosen to marry
her.
e The domestic responsibilities of the
are incurred
to husband and
support re!;ponsJ,o

!hat

per"on

present and
to the percentcapacity which
the marnage is com-

Marie

cru»<C'O"C worthiness relative to
that of the
diminishes because of the
manner in which these
are
The
of
wife's presthe home, for example, is equally
worthy with that of the husband's presence
in his career field.
e Her
on their domestic
bilities during his workdays enables
to
whatever benefits he acquires and/or
accrues in
career, as would her supporting him. for
through medical

I! How they delegate their ,."'''""'""

the busines:;, of no

SAN

fairen-

Elwell
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Re AB 525:
ADDRESSING
PROBLEM OF ASCERTAINING THE EARNING-CAPACITY
WHICH A PERSON MAY HAVE ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE:
This problem has been stated as an objection to Assembly Bill 525.
Yet, the courts have long been required by California Civil Code Sections
246 and 4801(a) to be able to evaluate a person's earning capacity. And,
in 1982, subsections (e) and (f) were added to Section 4801 (to assure
that formerly dependent spouses would enter the paid work force after
divorce, and to measure their earning capacity). These refer to "vocational training consultants," whose expertise is defined under Section
720 of the California Evidence Code. One of their professional qualifications is the ability to analyze and evaluate work skills.
At the outset of a marriage, each spouse had certain qualifications
and experience which, on dissolution of the marriage, such consultants
would be able to retrospectively evaluate, stating their marketable value
in current-dollar terms as the earning capacity which the person had when
the marriage began. They would be able to make a similar evaluation of
the person's qualifications and experience at the end of the marriage.
Under law from AB 525, each party would submit to the court the four
figures that he or she thinks are correct: the one for himself/herself
at the beginning of the marriage, the one for himself/herself at the end,
and parallel figures for the other party. On the basis of the testimony
of the vocational experts, the court would then ascertain the earning, if any, gained by each party during the marriage. The
capacity
percentage which the increase constitutes of the total earning capacity
at the end of the marriage measures the ~nv~tment of the marriage pahtHC.ft~h~p in the person's total earning capacity thenceforth.
This percentage of the resultant eMrU.ng<'> must be p!Lopeir%.y. Contrary to what some have advocated, half
it may not rightly be designated spousal support for the person's ~poUJ.>e any more than the other
h f may be so designated for the pe!Lhon. In consistency with principles
community-property law and no-fault divorce, no other condition may
ghtly
required to es
lish en t1ement to the appropriate percentthan the fact that the increase in earning
age of earnings as
the marriage. Unlike a spousal-support award,
capacity was gai
enti ement, once es
lished, may not rightly be eliminated by court
order.
- Elaine Elwell

11 (I
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About wasted lives

'Back

Thts is about a "wasted iife"-min<'
1 am a mother and a grandmother.
now divorced. wah 25 years of homt~
makmg bt'hmd me. My daughter is m
collegt.· prepanng for a career in soc1al
sen·1ce. Mv sons. both colkge graduatt''- holdm.g respl!nsible posittons. support the state wtth high taxes.
This state has told me that marnage
d1d not makL• me an equal partner with
mv husb:md ·- that my role was less
worthv than his. He and the state have
evaluated as almost negligtble my contribution to the earning-capacity increase which he gained while I took on
his equal share, as well as my own. of
our jointly incurred domestic responsl·
bllJties during his workdays.
He and his second w;fe keep for
themsel\·es nearly all of the mterests m
thts increase.
Meanwhile. I stumble along out of
~~n·p p~tSl nmldle
nt"ar the bottom
of the JOb market
_ hom•··
maker" program can retneve 2':J .;-ears
ol mv llfe - to say nothmg of suost··
quen.t years of reelmg: stunned and off
b,thmce. mv health d1min1shed. undc-r
shock of th~ astomshmg posltlOn of the
state regarding my former role
The tragic part of this story is that it
multiplied millions of times throughout
the countrv As intended by the "sona!
changer~,: these stones provide the ex·
ample~
given
sanction
.the
state - of what young women
not do w1th thetr lives They are part of
~omen's liberatiOn." the mon·nH:nt
to !Jberate people from the1r
responsibilities as parents. The idea is to
have the state takE> over thl'se
bt!ltJes. whill' both fathers and
careers and pay taxes. so
that
control may be com·
pkte- so that all may be automatons
parroting
Godless prect:pts
a

Led
one Michael Minton. a Chicago h.tv;ryer, there is currently a movement to price-tag the past "services" of
former homemakers going through divorce. Several weaknesses inhere in
Minton's
framework" for ali-

tutttl-controi

I wonder
wastt·d

division of income

bosh

than treat the homemaker
as one of the partners in an equal partnership forming the basic unit of society, he reduces her role to a mere performance of services. (According to The
Family Law
9/11179. Minton
had actually considered price-taggmg a
wife's sexual "services" based on a
-The quality
performance may
have been either better or worse than
that warra11ting Minton's,
tags.
And the claim
on each
"service" would
be controversiaL Thus, two bones of conttcnuon
are thrown into what is supposedly a
"no fault" situation, with the former
homemaker in the defensive. (Would
the husband be paid for his time spent
the lawn,

~tatv,

llves will be

PALO AL10

but as
Let's
off
sense, whiCh
of the
her role the equal dignity it
Wlth whatever career

deserw~

the

Elaine Elwell
PALO ALTO

-
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LENORE WEITZMAN (May 27, Page B5, Mid-Peninsula edition) notes that "An
equitable division of family income offers
the only possible cushion against the finan·
cia! hardship that divorce brings, , ."
I propose as "an equitable division" the
former spouses' equal sharing of the ongointerests in the earning-capacity .lll:
~ gained by each spouse during tbe
marriage.
In probably most marriages there iS a
real-dollar increase in at least one party's
earning capacity. (This is distinct from a
nominal-dollar increase, which would not
take into account the changed nominal
value. at the time of divorce, of the earning
capacity at the marriage's outset) If this
increase consitututes 40 percent of the
party's earning capacity at the time of di·
vorce, 20 percent of his/her gainful-employment earnings would belong irreversiblY to the other spouse for the remainder
of ·the party's working life. as would the
appropriate shares of tax liabilities and attached benefits (including bonuses. profit
shares and unemplo·rrnent benefits). The
percentage should be assigned directly to
the other spouse from its source. For Social
Securi!y purposes. the 20 percent should be
countedin the earnings record of the obl1·
gee. not that of the obligor The concept
sheds surer light on other retirement lnte~
ests. as welL
Spousal support would still be due. in addition. when marriage-incurred child-care
responsibilities preclude the custodial par·
ent's full-time gainful employment or when
a decline in the obligees own earning ca·
pacity during the marriage necessitates a
period of appropriate traming or educa·
tion.
Those concerned about justtce tn famJl\'
law should bring to their legislators· attention Weitzman's study and the need for
~~ated reform (If the ££:!_rG could bt:
counted on to rightly JUdge and order w!nl
is equitable, we divorcees would not be m
the inequitable economic CJrcumstance::we are in.)
Elaine Elwell
PALO ALTO
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Then she speaks of
bund
sion" wlii
this.
But why
moribund

SAN J')S[

f~ERCURY

NE'lS, Saturday

'!arch 19, 1'183

Fairness when a marria

Far from vague, as Joanne

AR 52:'i pn1dd•'" a prf'<:'ise means of
~he percenlagt> of a pPrson's po-:t-di\·orcP earnings attrihutahiE>
to tra:ni:-~g. t>rluc!tlon and experiencP
acquired duri1,g marriage. The bill
address€
an increase m earning
capJdty achit>ved by .!!!!Y means_

ascertawing

Sf\'~ JOSE ~1ERCURY NPJS

1aims

saturr'ayC~1arch 26, 1981

that's

all it
slavery

remains constant,
in an

As

with no fault,
rightly viewed

ln response to Elame Elweli's March
te
is involuntarv servitudP A
P£rson is just ·that
another pers:on. S0 just call It bv ib
true naJr,Q: slavery. I am not rcf('rrin);
to child support
If a pt'rson wanL<; payrnePt thf' law
should rFad th<~t hP or sh0 nw :t perfonq lalx'r
o'rwr \dit:,d:>k con~adur
rn. Tho:· 1·1·;, state~ that no
gre"tH I
l•
~-h~>•'J h•· l.t~d upon
one than
L;l·
(rtr:f r:-.: 1:1 th~·
an,l <
-I TtHS <"an be
corr··~ruh. tn h·' ··c;·v('~ ar.~d u;·,u:~ual po~-

Everytim:g on0 does, not merely
acqu:rinE; a p1 ofe~-;...,ional dt>gree, contributP::: to J,•s future. Hts spo!L'>f' also
contnbutb tfor <·xample. by bParmg
ana
h's children :md ta~
their other
incurred domestic
allowing him
tlmP aw! freedom to pursue his carf'<'r
int< res!>; Tht' law must address onlv
v.h_,( the marriagf' ii~'tually achieves.
not some <:peculation about what 1t
mtght hav\' <~chwved.
AB 52:.
nor
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1n to rernain
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inn Srni th

comprised two equally
as one in the context
ncurred responsibilities that
st prior to their m2rriaqe.
e arose from that joint base,
tu
a sin e legal entity.*
divorce precludes any charge
pause was less worthy than
the o her. Hence, the 1aw must recognize
he equal worth of their respective contribu on , whether direct or indirect,
to
increase.
(McAli
ret al) would reconstatute the principles of equalin such a way that the
may no lon
, in violation of
, retroac iv y
ace women in involser'vi tude.
- JoAnn "1ader

26 3) i
ulti t

i ng
crea

the court den
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her efforts and
wi h tho
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he increase
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divorce than before he was married
the marria , he earns more tr:c·1:c1, per
ulli n pro ided during her marriage
law to be ent tled to the recompense
pro
law and no-fault dir communi
And so did a housewife who had taken on the
child-care and other domestic
the hu band t
time and freedom to acquire :~1:d
ched through the arrangement to his paying career,
n his earning-capacity increase.
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CL'NCERNING THE ALLEGED INEQUITY OF A PERSON'S NOT BEING ENGAGED IN GAINFUL
EMPLOYMENT WHILE SHARING EQUALLY WITH HER EX-SPOUSE THE EARNINGS REALI ZeD A..S
RESULT OF THE YNCREASE TN HIS EARNING CAPACITY GAINED DURING THEIR MARRIAGE:

A

Whether or not a person works at a paying job after divorce is irrelevant
to her moral right to share equally in the percentage of the earnings arising
from the earning-capacity increase which her erstwhile spouse gained during the
marriage. She has a£heady worked for her share -- just as he has already worked
for his counterpart share -- duning the ~ge. He is now capable of realizing
more e.a':.YL,Lng.o per hour than he was before he married her (tte.at earnings -- that
is, taking into account the changed value of the norn,tnal dollar), but he does
not have to spend any more t,Lme. per hour doing so.
In the case of a traditional marriage, if his earning capacity is higher
at the end than at the beginning, the increase is reasonably attributable
largely to the fact that he. was not taking on the bulk of the domestic responsibilities incurred jointly with his wife, but instead had the time and freedom to pursue his career continuously and full time. (That he could have hired
someone to take over his equal share of those responsibilities is irrelevant;
it was his w-Lce who shouldered them [even i f she had household help in the process, just as he may have had a secretary or other employees working for lum].
Nor did her equal worth with him -- to the family, society and posterity -diminish by reason of the way they delegated their roles.) It is their joint
efforts and sacrifices --work attteady done, dutting the matt!tlage. -- that account
for the earning-capacity increase (which enables him to realize greater per-hour
earnings than before he married her)*.
It is impossible, of course, for the person to receive any gainful-employment earnings at al£ if neither he nor his ex-spouse is gainfully employed (or
if her earning capacity had not increased during the marriage), whereas it L6
possible (conditionally) for the ex-spouse to receive .oome earnings (her share
of those accrued during the marriage) even though .ohe may not be gainfully
employed. Her advantage in this, however, is justified by hl-6 advantage in
having control, and her not having control, over his employment. If he does
continue in, or resume, gainful employment, it would be wrong, tte.gattdee.,.~6 of
what ~
does or does not do, for him to keep her half of what had accrued
through their joint efforts and sacrifices. It would, in fact, be retroactively exploiting her -- placing her in indentured servitude to him. And this
is precisely what is happening in millions of divorce cases under present law.
Of course, if the ex-spouse has a child or children at home (as most
divorcees do have), she Lo working. Even i f the youngest is as old as 14 (or
even older), she has 24-hour-a-day responsibility for him or her as long as
he r he is a minor and is not emancipated by law. The jointly incurred responsibility for the child belonged equally to husband and wife during their marriage;
----------*That he might have gained the same increase had he not married is irrelevant.
He
marry, incurring responsibilities that he v:ould not have incurred otherwise -- responsibilities which, had he fulfilled them directly himself, would
have made it impossible for him to have the time and freedom that he d{d have
to pursue his career.
-85-
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the extra burden
it now on her balances the fact that she is no 1onge
performing other domestic duties in behalf of the father except those she
performs in connection with their child or children. By insisting on her
taking a paying job after divorce (even if by sharing equally in the reonomic benefits acquired and accrued during the marriage she would not
to take a paying job), the state places her value as an economic
resource higher
her value as a parent. Nor should it be the prerogative of the state to speculate as to the best interests of the child
relative to the custodial parent 1 s working, or not working, in the
force (that is, unless she cannot provide for herself and the
or children with equitable child support from the other parent and
h f of the economic benefits acquired and aeeAu~d through the operation
of their marriage partnership). If she has the responsibility, she ou t
to be allowed the
to exe
se it as she sees fit as long as
does not abuse the children.
If the father has custody of a child or
ldren of the marria
he, too, ought to be allowed the same choice without intervention on
part of the state (but of course with the same tipulations).
As for the case wherein both husband and wife worked continuously
and full time at paying careers throughout their marriage (
hired someone to perform their domestic tasks and having put
dren in day-care centers immediately a
they were born [and, if they
have a child, the wife, by having given birth to him/her, has alrea
contributed more to the marriage, society and posterity than has the h
ban ). there still remain
intan
es contributing to, or
ing
, the advancement of their res
ve careers: intangibles
i
the state has no business interveni g. Un
no-fault divorce l
state may neither right y a
to evaluate them nor ignore them
but must regard
hum
the contributions of each spouse as
ually worthy with the 6um
of the contributions of the
To
be
istent
recogni on of the
ity of the marriage
s ip (the state's
ing rightly
ized such equality while
intact) a with no-fault
vorce law, the state must requ
rties to a divorce to share equally in all that was
tions of
partnership. And,
c~
aMeJt
, this includes the po
on of ea~nings
i
as a result of the earning-capaci
gained by each spouse duri
the marria
The principles stated here
pply to at£ marriages, tra
onal or otherwise. But in most of the
"otherwise" marriage cases there will be greater offset (unless one pouse
tops his or her
ng work, which the other might likewise
).
###
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Lady in Green
somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff
not my poems or a dance i gave up in the street
but somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff
... this is mine/this
yr stuff/ ...
what can anybody do
somethin of no value on
a open market/ ... now wontchu put me
this is mine/now
me my stuff/ .. .
i gotta have tog
to my choice/ .. .
now you cant have me less i
me
... you cant have them or do nothin
stealin my s--- from me/ dont make
makes it
... my stuff
the
ripped off treasure of the year/ ... this is not
your prerogative/i gotta have me in my
dont ya find
& leave
of me for my des
to
i 11 give it to
really my
ya
it to me/if ya real
want
i'm
the only one/can handle
for colored girls who
have considered suic
when the rainbow is enuf
1977

-90-

PREFACE
TO ALL COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
This paper is submitted to you in the spirit of the future.
Because of the views expressed within, many of which are
unpopular with patriarchs and myopic feminists, I feel it
appropriate to preface them with a more personal note.
For the record, I am an American black woman: not a black
woman of the privileged middle-class; not a particularly
educated black woman, but rather, an ordinary black woman
who believes that deviating from the tenets of independence
and self-help--the hallmarks of my American status--will,
in the future, limit me much more than my blackness or my
womanliness.
We, as a people, are entering into a new age. We have no
guidelines for our future.
There are no pat answers on
which to fall back. The leveling factor for the young,
the old, men, women, whites and people of color in our
country is our
of individualism.
It is this heritage
of individualism, with its concomitant freedom of choice
which will allow us and even command us to come together
as families, coworkers and friends.
Many have argued that this "individualism and freedom bunk
is fine for white males who have always had their fair
share of both, but what about blacks and women who only
share a historical status as subordinates?"
"What about
the tradition of dependence and sacrifice which has been
our fate?" "Don't men 'owe' us something for that?"
I can only answer from my experential base.
I can only
answer as a former dependent and as a past frightened woman.
Simply, I discovered that my entrenchment into "You owe me"
and "After all I've done for you" pushed me deeper into the
quicksand of dependence, self-hatred and bitterness. My
redemption was the realiz
that no one "owes" anything
to anyone. We come together because we give of ourselves;
because we want to give and love and trust. But in the
final analysis each of us must recognize that there is a
self from which we

v
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In today's
where myths about the permanence of
the "place
and motherhood, and the father's
no longer reflect a stable real
there is a need for
contingent thinking and 1
contingent thought and
lifestyle need not exclude trust, but it does set as the
model for
and free choice the recognition that
our actions, choices and expectations must be tempered
an
that relationships once thought
may
and
ect to individual freedom and
change.
This type of contingency thought and lifestyle leaves the
underlying
s of marriage and family
those of sharing and giving freely with no strings and
expectations for restitution. Concepts of community and
partnership will remain intact. But added to the fami
calculus will be the proper and recurring questions-"If I do this, am I
to let it stand as a
ft
of love
"Are we prepared to go our separate ways and
stand firm in our commitment to our children's best
sts?"
Again,

:r:~y

ssion is based

ke

vi
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am vigorously opposed to AB 525, both as a statute and as
a reflection of a

lo

I

have compiled a list of major

defects in AB 525 from a s

, cultural, philosophical,

and public pol

This paper is written not

as an exhaustive

is of all the issues involved with the

the proposed passaged of AB 525 and similar legislation, but
as an attempt to

to the attention of this committee

highlights of those issues which are most objectionable.
There is indeed a problem.

Women and children are definite

victims in divorce actions

But they are not so much

victims of a husband and father as much as they are victims
of an "outworn historical reality, a reality that has ceased
to exist but that

alive in the collective memory,

carefully preserved, as

still prevailed."(Bernard,

1982:2)
While I have compiled

li t of major defects in AB 525, I

also hope that the list will have a pos
future

s

will take account of these issues

and help to alleviate a
AB

•
•

ive effect, in that
responsibly and fairly.

525:
+-"
11 and is harmful to the equal
Is a "
'rights of both women and men

and encourage s
and is based in sex di crimination

c roles for women

sm

slat

8

Engages

0

Promotes
speculat

0

Is a dual
aid

0

Invades

0

Violates

0

Deprives men and women of their
education and useful knowledge

0

Creates a system of
servitude and deprives
men and women of their post-dissolution earnings

marriage and encourages marriage as a
ary venture
and harms those it purports to

l

• s

ght to acquire

th the decision to enter

the
l
93~

To better understand AB 525 and these issues one must look
close

at the cultural basis for AB 525.

here to refer to

life

Culture is

passed on

This "

of

... values

of

of

relat

1975:2)

In

ques
1.

this cultura

must be answered:

What were the effects on women of the
Fami
Law Act?
V'lhat are the effects on women of increased
dissolution of
?

3.

What does AB 525

4.

What
serve,

function does AB 525

Who is
l.

to do?

by AB 5 5?

WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS ON WOMEN OF THE FAMILY LAW
Provis
(b) 1)

with the Fami

Law Act, specif

called for the

sion of

Women, who were

as the

, §4 0

0

than hal

, were now

commun

in accord to no-faul
f

cases

which the

fe \vas the

1 8 :772

the 196

aintiff,

s received

an

198

f

los

ssolution

caused many Cali

s

when in uncontested
·.c

ff.

w~.~..e

1

of who was pla

tion

its

of

Of course
was defendent

wa

innocence and
the basi

was

1962 525)
ff and

s

for

had to pay the

no

t

is

, many Cali

to feel cheated.

proper
(Meyer
2

-94-

, which was equal contr
Kinzer, 1859: 251

Law Act, (FLA)

Subsequent to the Fami

"more than half" percentage of the

attempted to regain the
community property.

wives have

i

AB

more than realize this

objective, at least
2.

WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS
OF MARRIAGE?

'VlOMEN OF INCREASED DISSOLUTION

The rate of di

U.S.

9 Os.

1960s through the late

0 and

estimated that between 1
157 percent.

(U.S.

o

from the early
Bureau of the Census research

978 the

rate increased

Commerce 1979)

respective share of di solution.

California saw its

The FLA also made the marriage

contract under no-fault,"a terminable contract, without penalty,
at

the option of

ither

1968 and 1972 the

,1973 26 8)

Between

awarded alimony dropped

from 20 to 15

ivorce cases in both Los Angeles

and San Francisco

and Dixon,l980:154)

Clearly the no-faul
awards were being
supporting.

"

al

(spousal support)

ied to encourage women to become self-

It can further

on men and women'
self-suf

ferred that the statistics
c statuses prove
should be encouraged.

(Weitzman,l98la:l2
At the same time
social change which
of the family
it

her book,

Fl

liforn

wives, another

the works--the decline
Ehrenreich so aptly calls
Dreams and the
of the breadwinner

"The
A system
the 1820s
unionists
the other
on the
as
to
women,
women are at least
It is ea
the fact, and
ce

"
one a fact,
is that men,
women.
The
higher wages
most women
by men.
has reinforced

the 197 s many men

to use their

to

ful
the labor market

in the wake

f
was clear

to contribute to
market

women were now "

household

some form of

Women

f

men s

v1ages and

Just as

response

and men's

were

and

women

" of

bene
division at di

(See Brown

became a

slat

re

their "more than half

meant

to
new

83

5

1

in
4

use
sex and pay

as an equalizer o

le which
are

close the selfnow exists because
employed and thus
awards. (CC§ 4806)

of
power of the State to

accomplish
by utiliz
regulate

AB 5 5

Fortunately, for
lation, the in

external

and s

lar legis-

on certain fundamental

liberties may be serious

and

to warrant federal protections.

Professor Baxter write
"His
cal
,
have been free
as matters o
for a
and an occas
marital and famil
federa
of dome

latures and courts
the critical rules
which were regarded
concern. Before, 1970,
th and
t decisions,
ss
ion of
, there was little
the state-controlled area
law. The federal judiciary
att
respected
law
marriage and

divorce.
ng of the
alleged
lassifications, has
local
icy
983:135)
The Harvard Law

marriage

turned on the
as the pr
(Maynard

, which served
j

. Hi

control.
cases, on the other

hand, often turn
the individual,
contra .

198

to
to

slative

1

and the
suits
.Butts,
would

law at issue

1

fn.25

8

1983

the
same sense

"Even though all restrictions on political, personal
and contractual rights were taken away, and she

stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an
absolutely equal plane with him, it would still
be true that she is so constituted that she will
rest upon and look to him for protection; ... her
maternal functions . . justify legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion
of man." (Ibid.)
is added)
Often the State's justification for maintaining the husband's
primary duty to support

the need to alleviate the effects

of past and current sex and pay discrimination in the labor
market.

But by preserving the husband's primary duty to

support or, in this instance, awarding what is his separate
property (if property at all) the State strengthens the reason
many women in the labor market are victims of discrimination:
women do not need a raise or a better pos

since women

can depend on husbands for support and property.
The state of California's Supreme Court also speaks about such
presumptions of women's dependence and need for paternalistic
protection when in
(WCAB), (1977) they

v. Workers'

s Board

te:

"The presumption [of widow's total dependency]
is a relic of an era in which the majority-of
-- ... accepted as axiomatic that
'the God of nature made woman frail, lovely
and dependent ... ' (Citation omitted) 'Frail,
lovely' she may
, but 'dependent' she
need not be. " ( : 4 0 4)
More alarming than the blatant

ionism in AB 525 is

the deep sense of

A.J. Richards in his

ism.

article,

and the Constitution:
on paternalism
liberal from deep

paternalism is the

of human

intrinsic limits on the

to

, the idea of
one person may control

the life of another even for putatively benevolent motives ... "

(1980:15)

"Paternalistic overprotection degrades its object

encouraging

"

(Ibid. , : 19)
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here when the Court speaks
State of a
purpose

is not an automatic
whi

the actual

1

poses under

AB 52

5:648)

employment

a

and

a look

channels

to the fu·ture.

pur~

ive because it he
suffer

current "

no

economic

because

sitional" spouses,

that is, between

support and the

new

AB 525 is

There is no

o

The

, career woman has the
assets" and augment

her "
their

se women v-;ho do earn less than
with a structural
workers.

Her
should

system which denies
and benefits

as to whom it
enter

the

to start jobs and
women
bus nesses.

ic
The

trend
of married
who were
the
than
in
ected
990."

"What this means is that by the mid-70s a 'tipping
point; had been reached in the trends of family and
work.
This was the point at which more than half of
all married women living with their husbands were in
the labor force, a
that is, at which non labor
force participation became 'deviant' statistically
speaking and labor force participation by married
women became 'normative.'
Thus the married women
living with their husbands who were in the labor force
now constituted the 'mainstream'.
Those not in
the labor force were a 'minority group.'"
(Ibid.)
II.

DEEPER AB 525 CULTURl\L ISSUES -- "SULLIVAN" AND BEYOND

s

There are no easy, snap

and answers in the Sullivan

case, in which a wife seeks to have her husband'sdegree and
earning capacity declared community property.
634+)

Sullivan can

(Sullivan,l982:

be considered a "transitional" case,

that is, a case between the old bargains and behavior for women
and the new

l

But to find justice for the
the critical question : Was Janet

future one

Sullivan a covertured or free woman?

A.

COVERTURED OR FREE--ARE CALIFORNIA WIVES PROVIDERS,TOO?
If one believes that Janet Sullivan was a covertured woman

devoid of any

her husband, and that her

to

covertured status superseded any self-sufficiency or no-fault
sions then her money i

overdue.

believes that it
wife" and that. the

If one further

to be the "doctor's
of

was a temporary stint until

she could only educate her husband, then again, her award
is very late.

9
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If

on the other hand, one bel

s that Janet Sullivan

was a free

adult

her role as

every husband is

then one may have a

to do,

that after the property

now

system was

di

reimbursement due.

It is not

chance that I

in the question the phrase,

"handled her role
to do."

as every husband is expected

If Ms. Sul

the husband role

for only a moment

that few reimbursements

and remedies for
husband has poweris he?

that

flow

Some argue,

B.

who handled

for that is because a

is the

the household." But

f

Some scholars

HUSBAND AS
ONLY ROLE?

LABOR

For most husbands,

~illRKET

WORK HIS

f household" means "he

s expec

resources

f

t take

, pay doctor's
le hi

able-

the house'."
(Rossi, 19

s re

A

wife is not
direct.
(Foster

19

o

the

law at

of the

the husband
In 196
had

~10

lls

Regarding support, at common law the husband's duty to support
was reciprocal: he owned, managed and controlled his wife's
property.

Today

he pays the cost, but is no longer the boss.

Bernard summarizes the husband's new position by explaining
the new language in the census.

(1982:15)

"The rise of the Good-Provider role may be said
to date from the 1830s when a great deal of work
formerly done in the home began to be moved into
outside
and its demise may be said to have
occurred April 1, 1980 when the United States no
longer assumed that the husband was head of household.
;In the 1980 census, the Bureau of the Census ...
discontinued the use of the terms 'head of household'
and 'head of family.' Instead the terms 'householder'
and 'family householder; are ... used.'"
(Rawlings, 1980:39 as quoted in Bernard, 1982:15)
Women are independent regarding their own earnings and property
and husbands no longer have the right to their wive's
services--modern marriage is a domestic partnership.

What

does this decline of husband as "head of household" mean to
California women?

V'Jhat do the new roles and expectations hold

in store for women?

For one thing, the answers to both

questions portend added responsibility for one's own decisions
and actions.

No longer will women be able to say, "I did it

for him" and "He

me to do it."

It means women and future

"Janet Sullivans" will have to carefully balance and weigh
"protective
displaced

"
ibil

choice rights".

No longer will

iesbe so easily tolerated

~n

women.

III. DISPLACED RESPONSIBILITIES
A.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF THE FREE CALIFORNIA WOMAN
The difference between "protective rights" and "choice
rights" can best be explained:

11
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lude the

be

"
age
or status,
al investment
free, noncovertured
between
of coverture.

t

a

fe s

world.
of a
upon her a

coverture.
ion becomes
into focus

" must
freedom to

lear

responsibility for their future
this responsibil

take personal

encourages people

The true meaning of

there

l

lead to wise decisions.

v-li 11

must take chances, make mistakes
subsequent results.

no guarantee that

This i

the

and dearly refer to

earn from tht:;

and

cycle we cherish

sense."
lity discussed is frightening.

For many women the respons
would rather remain "

." But there

to pay for that type of

It is a "perpetuation of

earlier attitudes--all which may be
radically nonadapt

but are also

in our contemporary world.

withour responsibility.''

s a high price

(May, 1972:63)

is no democractic way to hol

It is innocence

Quite frankly, there

only men responsible as individuals.

One of the most critical areas in which women must take
clear responsibil
homemakers.

is

the decision to be "full-time"

Historically, and even currently many family

decisions with

to support are attributed solely to men,

with the idea that when a woman leaves the labor market to
become a "full-time

homemaker she is doing so for 9er

Phrases, such as, "

labor market to devote her time

to domestic duties" and "
earning capac

,total

which says she
the labor market.
exclus

up her chance for developing
absolve women of the responsibili

a

role in the decision to leave

There is

"homemaker" option

for women.

B. THE HOMEMAKER

WOMEN ONLY?

The most jealous
has wi
att~ached

almost a

husbar;~~.

"

its
to its

" for most women, which

sponsibil
ion,
have had

American women for

l

opt

homemakers while the husbands bore
dissolution for that decis

ies but almost none
deciding to become
responsibility at

c
market
the
fluent,
1982 4)

1

for

upon as
others,
per

homemak

C.

EXPECTATIONS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOH THETH FULFILLMENT

An extension of a woman's new responsibilities also lie
in the case of

ions and their fulfillment.

If the

answer to the question, "If I do this, am I prepared to let
it stand as a gift of love?, is no, then

must be articulated.

If educating a spouse brings the expectation of sharing future
benefits, whether in or after the marriage

it must be ccrnrnun-

icated directly and honestly or the spouses will "expect the
courts, i.e. the government, to redress an inequitable situation
of the individual's own making.''

(Miller, l983:C-l)

The

California marriage contract (CC§ 5100), only requires mutual
support.

An education is extrinsic to its terms.

contracts, however, between spouses are honored.
366)

(CC§ 5103)

Property
(Dawley, 1976:

If a "Janet Sullivan" feels support is

a reimbursable investment then a personal service contract as
with sports figures is enforceable.
"Individuals have operated ... as personal managers
who promise to obtain employment and also to
develop the star for a percentage of future
earnings. The personal manager (unlicensed)
promises to invest his own time and knowledge in
the development of the actor's skills and talents
in return for a share of the star's future
earnings generated in the investment in that human
capital." (Krauskopf, 1980:390)
Above all, the presumption

f marriage's donative i

tent must

be preserved.
1953; See v. See, 1966 and
still believe in the
as espoused in

of marriage

and

swold v. Connecticut:

"[M]arriage is more than a contract.
It is not a
mere matter of
consideration. (Maynard v.
Hill, 1887)
"[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; ... a bilateral loyalty, not
a commercial or social project. (Griswold v.
Connect1cut, 1965:486)
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SSOLUTION
the re

i

ie

return to the
'women s nonto make
the husband
and
course
and means
icult to achieve
(Bernard, 1 81:
into a
a spouse.
1"
l

scrut

If so argued, then the "
s
designed to
mitigate the continuing consequences of past
economic abuse
be characterized
not
as an
slative goal,
but a state
weight to
meet even the more
'compelling• interest
standard. ( : 4 0 4)
The distinctions and thus the important differences between
Kahn v. Shevin and the proposed bill, AB 525 are:
l.

Arbitrary
process (See Section VI, infra)

2.

Other fundamental federal r

3.

The presumption of
classifications.

4.

The means

and

iled.
onali

which the

ective c

in t.axation
be achieved.

tion

L

"the act of confe
deprive

AB 525, on the
and funds
XIV Amendment)
2.

he denial of due

a benefit upon
of any substantse entitled. (See
California, 1976:46)

the spouse with an
of pos
ssolution property
he or she is entitled. (U.S. Constitution,

Fundamental Federal

led

no federal
is imperiled,
classifications
s
their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxa+:ion." (: 355) (emphasis
added)
525 is
a axati
case and many ederal rights,
some declared fundarnenta
are
iled.

1
09

ect~

ensures

her s

June Aline Eichbaum
based privacy versus
of individual

on the ideology of autonomyains the importance

1

l

"A civil
, rooted in the
of equality
and autonomy is
ligible
in relation to
individual persons within society. A family-based
right would bolster the worth of those persons who
elected to bond together in family
ts at the
cost of
shed protection for those who did
not marry or otherwise live within familial territory."
(1979: 371-372)

and men's place in
"fundamental

c worlds of work and politics

violate

the

The traditional s

violates the

under this
self-fulfillment in terms
sl

responsibilit

of women to

vis

f th

rational beings, of their own

t

tion

sed

equal

of treat

To pass

home

ly in the s

To view women's

II

as free and

(Richards, 1980:29)
roles and

which has these
in AB 5

, exist on

as a further viola-

of

LEGISLATIVE
believe such 1
women in the

1

of

lat on aids
back the cl
discrimination.

to

with current
aw

the short

women and is
l

advantage of

been excluded, namely homemaker

the

AB 525, the

ter press

the-scenes

lative
based on sex is

cas~

ral as it favors a class from

men have trad

McAll

'k

discrimination
I!

answer to strict scrutiny.

9
1

f

st"
that "even

l

wife} have equal
s

.

l

true), when faced

for one o

them, "the

choose to invest
husband

.

_._l

the

980:387)
sume that "maximum

ut

factor for

i

fami

again err when
s of investment
is

, or unemp
s

, the

a clear sum:nary
future
backward
continue to move toward
s

soc

"(1983:C~

C.

''SULLIVAN,, ROLE REVERSl,LS AND DISSOLU'I'TON

It is ironic

move toward

full

one mus

series of

the law

reinforce s

Whi

women
to a

ich tend

to

roles for women and in some cases,

it would be

cult

Mark Sullivan and

men

professional educat

o show that

recei

were

there is

ty in the
and

a

serious

when roles of
reversed and

1rg

wife assumes the
a set of

ion

aws must exami

these
Cal

ividual

the

and i

heavier burdens on the supporting

spouse than

son between t

responsibil

men) and

spouse

out that in

such

the roles

the rules and

s

in a di

and are applied
and

i

a

re reversed,
s. The

e

" assumes

f
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s, leisure,
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s

scretion of the

t

AND TIME
OF THE OTHEH

standards of the
are

spouse
and the priori-

the

scretion of the
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from
ing a
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co:rmnunl
the

the is
f

t

educat

of an

ffort, skill
in teres

and
i

the

of a studen

AN EDUCATION WITH
SPOUSE OR THE COMMUNITY.
n

schoolto

lete

vli hin

and finances.

to have

unable
t

o

the dis

duration

1

the "

"

MAY CLAIJvl
IMPAIR!>iENT UPON LEAVING THE LABOR
~iARKET THUS BUILDING ADDITIONJl.L SUPPORT
DAMAGES."

Rather than
been relieved of the

the view that the
spans

spouse ha

of

1

r market and rna

th

t~akes

that when

the labor

may be
law doe

that the
not build into

0

contribution to
bears no
1

r

the
Recent

CC

amended
the Court
amend-

-an
pre
s

437

COURT MUST
FOR SUPPORT

TIME "DEVOTED TO DOMESTIC DUTIES"

dome
( l) )

SUPPORT BASED ON THE SUPPORTRA.THE:R THAN THE ACTUAL INCOI,E:
:1

1955:
979:99
COURT MAY
l\1ARRIAGE,

7 :
f

Rome,

J"URISDICTION AFTER A LENGTHY

sdiction

at the

FUTURE

that a

ss the record
able
affects the burden

spousal
The

son
o

8

evidence

Evidence Code
which may be

§

of the evidence,

502 gives three possible levels of proof
red in a case, (1) Proof
a preponderendce
by clear and convincing proof;

(2)

and (3) proof beyond a

e doubt. Even fraud may be

proved by no more than a preponderance of the evidence.
Sierra v. Brown,l97l:l05) The California Supreme Court
in Morrison chose a higher level of proof than is ordinarily
required in civil cases, even
m)

a fraud case.

COURT CANNOT ENGAGE IN SPECULATION ABOUT THE ABILITY TO
MEET FINANCIAL NEEDS IN THE FUTURE.
The Court cannot and must not engage in speculation.

It may not "burn its bridges." If the record does not contain
evidence of the supported spouse's ability to meet his or
her future needs the Court must maintain jurisdiction.
(Morrison, 1978:452)
n)

MAY RECEIVE A SPOUSE-SUPPORTED EDUCATION AND TR~INING
AFTER DISSOLUTION AS REHABILITATIVE SPOUSAL SUPPORT
The

judges

the "abil

to engage in gainful

employment" which is another of the factors

CC§ 4801,

does not mean that the spouse is compelled to take any
position that comes

I

the spouse has potential for

advanced employment, the Court may order

support

sufficient to provide for living expenses at school or college.
Clearly the

is that if a supported spouse has not

pursued an education

he or she may be

allowed to do so after
of rehabi
as
of

"[T)he concept

tative [spousal

is premised on the

ion that the wife(sic) has been lulled into a sense
by

considered
single person."

and has not prepared herself or
herself for self-support as a newly
, 1978:957)
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2.
a)

THE SUPPORTING SPOUSE

MAY NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE THE LABOR MARKET AFTER MARRIAGE
IF A SUPPORTING SPOUSE THUS CAUSING EARNINGS AND SUPPORT
TO CEASE
Although the Fami

Law Act requires both husband and

wife to support one another,

(CC§§ 242; 5100), until

Penal Code§ 270 (a} was amended, effective January 1, 1977,
to apply to both spouses, only a husband could be put in jail
for failure to

his wife.

duty to support" obl

This "husband has primary

could have been the basis for a

wife's recovery of

l expenses, etc., if she were

the supporting spouse and the sex-based obligation still
existed in California.

Professor Krauskopf alludes to this

when she writes:
"The employed spouse/student situation is
different, however, because the employed wife
is performing a
never imposed by
society and,
, she should not be
presumed to perform
gratuitously."
(1980:

394)

, the
b)

statute reads, "mutual support."

FIFTY PERCENT OF ALL EARNINGS ACCRUE TO THE SUPPORTED
SPOUSE.
1859:247+)

{CC§ 5105)

CO~~UNITY PROPERTY EARNINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE COMANAGEMENT
OF THE SUPPORTED SPOUSE.

§

1 5)

PERSONAL TIME SUBJECT TO DIRECT EARNING

PRIORIT
SCHEDULE
is e
bus

1

true

f

a

employee with normal

hours.

MAY DONATE EFFORT, SKILL AND TIME TO A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF SPOUSE
VOLUNTARISM
(CC§ 5125

))

28
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f)

MAY EXPEND COMMUNITY PROPERTY FUNDS FOR AN EDUCATION
WITH NO REIMBURSEMENT TO COMMUNITY

g)

MAY HAVE TO COMPENSATE THE SUPPORTED SPOUSE FOR LEAVING
THE LABOR MARKET.

The law assumes that the supported spouse is leaving the
labor market at the behest of the supporting spouse to
perform "domestic duties."

This presumption when coupled with

the community property concept means that the supported spouse
upon leaving the labor market, accrues an interesting "two-fold"
interest in both the support and the property interests of a
marriage both based on presumptions.

The interest is an

equal interest in the community property and an impairment
interest in the support aspects of marriage.
h)

(CC§ 480l(a) (6)}

ABILITY TO EARN
EVEN IF UNEMPLOYED.

MAY BE LIABLE FOR
RATHER THAN ON

Under the rules enunciated by the California judiciary,
a support order can be imposed on a supporting spouse,
even if unemployed, if the spouse can be gainfully employed
or if the spouse has the ability to earn.

The Court is thus

free to speculate that the supporting spouse will work and
to force the spouse to work under penalty of jail.
In re Marri
1980:965)

(See

of Chala, 1979:999; In reMarriage of Rome,
The supported spouse, on the other hand, will be

forced to work only if the record "clearly indicates" that
the spouse will be able to adequately meet financial needs.
The Court cannot guess nor speculate about future earnings.
It should be noted that Chala was a 62 year old man and the
speculation on his employability was the "husband can be
gainfully employed by his sons at their service station."
(Chala, 1979:999)
i)

MAY PAY SUPPORT INDEFINITELY AFTER A "LENGTHY" MARRIAGE

(Brantner, 1977:416+; Neal, 1979: 834+)

29
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j)

MUST PROVE SUPPORTED SPOUSE'S ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY MEET
FINANCIAL NEEDS IN FUTURE TO TERl'HNATE COURT JURISDICTION
AND POSSIBLE
80

Ef
allow

l Code was amended to

spouses

supply evidence for the

record to br
vide

k)

consultants to prof

the

(See CC§ 4801 (e), (f))

MAY BE ORDERED
PROVIDE "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION AND
TRAINING FOR A SUPPORTED
(CC§ 48

3
2

slative interpretations

Under the current judicial and
of the rules and responsibilit

f

ing and supported

spouses it is clear that Mark Sullivan and other men who either
spouse role may:

are or may be in the
--Leave the labor market
--Earn no Wages
--Claim "homemaker" status
--Comanage the

funds

co~~unity

--Attend school,

sional or others

--Meet the community obl
duties

ion through "domestic

--Dissolve the marriage at will under no-fault
--Start work in the labor market
earnings with

--Maintain the
no reimbursement
Moreover, the

spouse, in the case of Janet Sullivan,

were she a husband, would presumably be told

the Court and

legislature she:
--Elected to be the

spouse
property

--Mainta
--Agreed to the spouse's educat

s
an education in the
after dissolution

--Should be
marriage

nor rehabilitative
spouse was educated in the
after dissolution.

--Is not 1
spousal
s
marriage and started
A "reimbursement o
added to the

expenses" clause must be
Code, to rebut the donation

-------------~-----------

of community funds

(See California Law Revision

Commission,
s, 1983)

=--"-----

of Educational
As the law stands currently a supported or

supporting spouse may receive an education in marriage with the
education of

spouse

of domestic duties.
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under the aegis

s

because
a

nature

short--

ifelong
intent when
to pursue

1

better

c

her or

s

the future

when one

s, and
"a cot,

of what
so
8

Court
1 61:425;
1972:119;

Over the past decade, however,
occurred which chall nge a
about marriage.

(1)

and legal changes have
ete

tatc:s'

right.s idc:oloqy

They are:

Family relations:

women's new roles in the home

and in the labor market;
of household;

single and divorced heads

and increased cohabitation without

marriage.
(2)

Economic relat

(3)

An expans

between spouses,

(Glendon, 1976)

of the meaning of the Equal Protection

Clause and the due process clause of the
Constitution

ly matters.

u.s.

(Baxter, 1983:

135)
These and other social and
family law toward the

of marriage.

An example of this
Law Act,

a trend in

s

(Glendon, 1976)

is the 1970 California Family

(CC§ 4000 et. seq.) with its "no-fault" and dissolution

of marriage provis

of the FLA, the legislature

declared the rna

0

the status of marriage was much less

important than it had been

1872.

The parties now were

allowed to terminate the status of

by a mere finding

of irreconcilable differences (CC§ 4506
pleading, (CC§ 4506)

proo

with no specific

4509) and without corrobora-

tion.
The Family Law Act

so

age

bas

lly two

realms, one the realm of status, i . . the terms of marriage
regarding support and obli
are codified in CC§
5100--mutual
was less

, fidel
ted

While the State

the

f the status of marriage,

(In re Marriage of Walton 197
under the State's

the terms were

s and

in

11 hold:
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11 very much
v. Hill

various
1

contro

f

as a union o

"The idea of

a role [in the] ..

rather than as a unit ha
[beginning to) Wl
698)

The

two autonomous individuals
ation."

to contract free

abil

ated issue

about property and

with one another

and the comanagement of

property in a California

and thus full

of the marriage

marriage introduced

and individual interests, both

individual and marital

under the U.S.

of which are fundamental and
Constitution.

(Glendon, 1976:

stated that, "[T]he

It can be

1'

s not] enshrine '

Constitution

tate interests

ies.

in addition to

The open-ended

provisions of the Cons

tution instruct the judiciary to protect

individual rights, not

tate

s "(Harvard Law Review,

1980:1182)
A.

INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
interests to individual

This movement from group and fami
individual interests

s not new cultural

and

but its
mid-1970s with

ion

, (1972) These

1

s demand that the proponents of AB 525

Pound, "It is import-

consider the caveat

interests

ant to distinguish
from the
ins

law is as new as the

Ei

cultural and

(Maine, 1917:99)

interest

domestic relations
as social

tutions."(l91

AB 525 either doe

if it does
family-based

attempts to elevate

due process and privacy.

rights" above the

freedom for women flows

This

ly enjoyed by

toward
men, rather than toward

of both marital partners
,of course

by the
in

of

the

"

and
74

419)

is "implicated
that is acribed to

WHODUNIT

s

close to
s

a person'

t

le

1

stence,

Fortunately, it is not only scholars who share the previously
mentioned view of privacy, due process, tradition and personhood
bu!

t hf' !J.

s.

Finance Corp,

Court as well.

In

v. Household

(1972) the Court narrowed the distinction between the

protection of

and

and the subsequent

c activit

s.

This decision

is of of great importance to those

spouses whose earning capacity increases during marriage and who
would then be directed by the

slature and judiciary to pay

post dissolution and thus
former spouses.

property dollars to their

(In re Marriage of Fortier, 1973; CC§ 5118)

Justice Stewart explains that the concept of personal rights
means also:
" ... the right to enjoy property without unlawful
deprivation, no less than the right to speak
or the right to travel, ... [a] fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right
to liberty and the person
in property ...
[n]either could have meaning without the other
(Lynch,: 552)
In Al

r v. Loui iana the Court found:
"The 1
mentioned [in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment] means not only the
right of the
izen to be free from the mere
phys
res
of his person, but ... to embrace
the
... to be free in the enjoyment of all his
facul
to be free to use them in all lawful
ways;...
earn his livel1hood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation ...
(1987:589) (emphasis added)

Truax v. Raich,

(1915) concurs:

the common
is of the very
essence of
freedom and opportunity
that
was the purpose of the Amendment[XIV]
to secure.
:41)
For those who would trounce the traditions of liberty Justice
Goldberg writes in

swold v.

-

cut:
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The main cause and effect levels are five:

(1)

Monetary support provides sustenance.

(2)

Sustenance may provide freedom from labor market participation.

(3)

Freedom from labor market participation produces time in
which to pursue a great many other activities, including
education.

(4)

Education provides the potential for an occupation.

(5)

An occupation, if pursued, provides income.

Otis Dudley Duncan, a pioneer in the development of the status
attainment model, concludes there is,
" ... a high correlation between the amount of education
and the size of income of workers in an occupation with
the NORC (National Opinion Research Center) prestige
rating of them and that income and education and occupation are functionally related.
This means that education
is a cause of occupation while income is an effect of
occupat1on," (Duncan in Reiss, et al., (1961:116-117)
as quoted in Sokoloff, (1980:22)
Income, of course, has the fundamental value for dissolution
purposes.

Even proponents of the "human capital investment"

theory concede the indirectness involved in measuring the
"return on investment through education."

Krauskopf acknow-

ledges:
"Much recent economic research has been devoted to
methods of quantifying or measuring the value of an
education .... A person'
skills and knowledge constitute
his capacity to produce goods and services, but because
no market exist for selling and buying human capacity
as exists for land or machinery, the value of human
capital must be measured indirectly through the income
or earnings that a person will be paid for his capacity
to produce."
(1980:382)
This means that only after the income is produced can one
attempt to correlate the value of the education and the
increase of the income without resorting to total statistical
speculation.
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" ... [t]he right to study any particular subject or
any foreign language [is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the
11 of
] ... Yet the First
Amendment has been construed to include certain of
those rights (1965:482) ... In other words, the State
may not, cons
with the
of the First
Amendment, contract
available knowledge.
The right of freedom of
and press includes ...
the right to
, the right to read (Martin v.
Struthers,l943), and freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought ... --indeed the freedom of the entire university
community. (
omitted)
D.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND PEONAGE
Finally, AB 525 would

an invididual's personal

rights and offend the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by
servitude in most

automatic status of involuntary
marriages.

In marriages where the husband is the breadwinner, an achiever
and for

tance, an execut

and the wife is a homemaker, any

increase in the husband's earning capacity would add to an
overwhelming personal

for the husband and a longterm

annuity for the

based s

This is parti

offens

when one realizes the

50

st

wife already accrues
property.

on the

For a student spouse

a

debt would be even
v. Alabama, (1911:240-241)

idence of marriage.
homemake~

the community
sional field the

and longt.erm.
In Bailey
rteenth Amendment is clarified:

"While the
concern was
African slavery,
amendment
not 1
to that .... The words
involuntary servitude have a '
meaning than
slavery' ... The
was to abolish slavery
of whatever name and form and all its badges and
incidents; to render
any state of bondage;
to make labor free by
that control by
0
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on labor

presented

s

Redhail introduced and established two central
and

are critical to States
They are, f

t, the

which
marital statutes.

to marry as a fundamental and

thus protected
States' enacting statutes
decision to enter

First the cases leading to

Redhail.
A.

MOVING TOWARD THE RIGHT TO MARRY
The 1887 case

an Oregon Territory case

dis so

characterized marriage as

"the most important relation
a Nebraska law wh

life."

(:205)

v. Nebraska,

forbade the teaching of any language

other than English to a child under
right 'to marry' as

central

the Due Process Clause."

grade held "the
of the 1

protected by

(192 :399)

In 1942, the Court heard Skinner v. Oklahoma, and struck down
for the s

a statute which
criminals.

The

declared that

were fundamental to
race.

(:541)

In

zation of habitual
and procreation

existence and survival of the
a, the laws arbitrarily

----~~------~----

a fundamental liberty protected
by the Due Proces

C

freedom

marry. The Court's

in
The freedom
the
1
pursuit of
'basic civil
existence and
v. Oklahoma

zed as one of
to the orderly
men. Marriage is one of the
fundamental to our very
at 12, quoting Skinner
942:541)
declared the protructions and advice

uncons

opinion that

there was a const

to marital privacy.

43

were

"Since our past decisions make clear that the right to
marry is of fundamental importance and since the
classificat
at issue here significantly interferes
with the
se of that right, we believe that 'critical
examination' of the state interests advanced in support
of the classification in required." (Citations omitted)
(: 3 8 3) (emphasis added)
While the Court appeared adamant about the fundamentality of the
right to marry and

heightened scrutiny in the Redhail case

it is only fair to note that the Redhail decision appeared
to imply two ideas which were unintended by the Court.
C.

THE OTHER "RIGHT TO MARRY" CASE-- CALIFANO v. JOBST
The first idea was that the Court was over-reaching in
its "heightened scrutiny" of state ~egulations regard-

ing marriage.

The Court had long held and continued to hold

that the regulation of marriage was by and large still under
the authority and judgment o

the States .. Justice Marshall

offered this disclaimer:
"By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right
to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state
regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of
or prerequis
for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrut
To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not s
fi
interfere with decisions

'rhe second

was that the Court was

opinions and

based on the opinion in a case decided

ier that Term, Califano v. Jobst.
vi
bene

of the Social
ts

istent in its
Jobst involved the pro-

Act specifying that secondary

by a disabled dependent child of a covered

wage earner would

when the child married an individual
ts under the Act.

who was not entitled to
rationalized in Jobst

The Court

that one, marriage was an event which

usually changed economic status, and more often than not the
included the val

assumption "that a married person is

less likely to be

on his parents for support than

who is unmarried." (:53)
45
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absolute
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rst

"

the issue of

wr
appe lee
court order,

Just as Boddie v. Connecticut was held unconstitutional because
the statute denied indigents access to the courts to

obt~in

a divorce because of fees and costs, so too does the statute in
Redhail directly deny indigents unable to meet child support
payments a marriage license,

(not withstanding the fee of the

marriage license) .
More to the second point and AB 525 is the Court's distinction
of the second type of financial burden and its effect on interfering with the right to marry.
heart of the issue of s

This distinction goes to the

ficance and substantial

They

write:
"Many others, able in theory to satisfy the statute's
requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having
to do so that they w1ll 1n effect be coerced 1nto forgoing their right to marry.
And even those who can be
persuaded to meet the statute's requirements suffer a
serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an
area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental."
{:374) (emphasis added)
The distinction between

and substantial or significant

interference with the right to marry is of course an issue with
AB 525 and similar legislation.

The opinion held in this state-

ment is that substantiality and significance should not be
inferred from directness nor insubstantiality and insignificance
from indirectness.

The impact of the inferences has perhaps

never been better expressed than in the following paragraph from
the Harvard Law Review:
"The result [of the
], of course, is to reduce
the test to one of directness.
But emphasizing directness to the exclusion of significance creates a danger
that the protection of the right to marry will become
illusory; only direct interferences will be scrutinized,
even though in most cases, the State can achieve a
similar interference by indirect means. (1980:1253)
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The public interest, especially for women, rests upon the promotion and protection of individual rights.
What will be different is that women, more and more, will be
asked and expected to bear more responsibility for their own
futures and lives.

This freedom, responsibility and individual

rights doctrine will also force us as a country and a state
to begin to make critical decisions about the type of future
we want vis-a-vis families, parents and children.

In making

these decisions we will no longer be able to take for granted
and collectively benefit from women's free labor and then pass
off the responsibility for this extraction of women's labor and
resources to husbands.
In the short run, this shift in responsibility will be expensive,
difficult and challenge the status quo in both the nation and
the State.

But in the long run, the shift will prove not only

to be beneficial to the nation and the State but necessary to
preserve it.

We have a tremendous stake in the family whether

that family is viewed as a collective or as an "association
of two individuals."

(Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972:453)

We "rely to a considerable extent on the family not only to
nurture the young but also to instill the habits required by
citizenship in a self-governing community.

We have relied

on the family to teach us to care for others [and] to moderate
... self-interest .... " (Berns, 1976:222) We have further relied
on the fami

for "[t]he basic process of cultural transmission,

without which the traditions and fundamental values of the
society are not passed on ... " (Hafen, 1983:478)
that families provide "a princ
duty."

source of moral and civic

(Hafen, 1983:477)
women's equal

we

Our stake is

and the respect for individual rights

as a nation and a State and a soc

will be forced to put

our money where we have mouthed saccharine sentiments about the
importance of family, home and parenting.
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APPENDIX C

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSUMBLY JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE CONCERNING ASSEMBLY BILL 525
November 16, 1983
My name is Ted Cranston.

I am an attorney, and I have

practiced in the area of estate planning, trust and probate law
for the past 20 years.

I am a member of the Executive

Committee of the State Bar Estate Planning, Trust and Probate
Law Section, and I am here today as their representative.
As you know, our section is opposed to Assembly
Bill 525 as it has been

proposed~

however, the message I want

to deliver today is more than that.

We recognize the injustice

a dissolution inflicts on a person who worked to help his or
her spouse obtain a degree which enhanced earning capacity.
Often the working spouse also sacrifices his or her own
education.

When a divorce ensues, the working spouse's

inability to thereafter receive the rewards of the enhanced
earning capacity constitutes a demonstrable inequity.
It is our belief that the problem is best resolved in
the dissolution process through the award of increased spousal
support (in amount or duration) or through reimbursement (of
the amount contributed to the education process or the cost of
a comparable education).

Making the increased earning capacity

a property right merely creates additional problems and
inequities.
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earnings of the surviving husband following the wife's death.
If the wife left her estate to one other than the husband, the
husband would be working for others from there on.
2.

Assume the case where a dissolution has taken

place and a former wife has been awarded her share of the
"earning capacity" asset.

Presumably, that asset is subject to

disposition by her in the same way as any other asset.

Thus,

she could, by her will, leave this interest to her second
husband.

Following her death, her second husband would have

the right to participate in the earnings of the first husband
so long as the first husband continued to work.

Needless to

say, this approach creates inequities of its own in an effort
to solve an injustice about which most people would agree.

One

wonders, in this example, how long and how enthusiastically the
first husband might work under the circumstances.

Given the

number of divorces that occur, the effect upon the working
population might be devastating over a period of time.
3.

Assume again that a dissolution has taken place

and that the wife has received her share of the "earning
capacity" asset.

Why is she not free to sell this asset as she

might sell any other asset, thus converting the right to
receive funds over a period of time to a present lump sum?
Then her husband would have a third party partner for the
balance of his career.
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s

s now on appeal before

eve that the legislature

should await the Supreme Court's decision in that matter before
acting.
The Law Revision Commission is now drafting a statute
designed to reimburse the working spouse for the effort
expended to educate the non-working spouse.

This statute

follows the suggestions of the concurring opinion in the
Sullivan case.

We believe that this, and other potential

solutions not involving a property right concept, deserve
attention to rectify the injustice that now exists.
While we oppose the property right concept of AB 525
because of the inequities we believe it would create, we would
be happy to provide estate planning imput concerning other
suggestions which are put forth to help achieve a solution to
this problem.

We would be pleased to assist in any way that we

can and to work with you, the Family Law Section and others to
come up with a feasible and workable recommendation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.
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Mr. Larry Stirling
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2.

Page 2

The bill prolongs ties between parties.

3. It will require a new industry of "experts" who will be
testify as to the "percentage of increased qualifications."
4. The cost in attorney fees to the already beleaguered
litigants will be enormous.

5. The court system will be enormously stretched in order
to try these issues since they will add a substantial new
issue to virtually every case.
6. ~Lawyers, because of their legitimate malpractice
concerns will be required to "take their best shot" at
obtaining such value in the courtroom.
(Ref: Smith y.
Le~is)

7. The appellate prQcess will, of course, have to be
increased to handle the myriad interpretations that will
naturally flow from inventive lawyers properly representing
their clients.
In other words, the bill is a disservice to the law, to the
lawyers, to the courts, to the appellate process, but most
of all, to the people themselves and the points raised above
are merely prQcedural problems.
On balance, there is no wide-spread evil either real or
perceived that needs a cure. You are using a bazooka to
kill a gnat. The evil perceived is that on occasion a
doctor or lawyer obtains an education at the expense of
his/her spouse. The bill opens up all of self-improvement
during_the marriage to judicial review and evaluation.
All cases must be presented through the testimony of
competent and qualified witnesses. What sort of monster
will this create? We will have to present educational or
vocational experts in order to affix percentages and to
testify as to the enhancements in qualifications.
Both sides will be required to have experts, not only to
rebut other's expert but to testify about their own
qualifications.
After fixing value, an accounting will be required to
subtract and make demand for the so-called separate property
contribution by the person being educated.
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CASE
INITIAL PHASE
J

lNIERVIEW cr..mn'

1.5

1.5

1.5

FILING & BASIC PLEAD~

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.5

1.5

EXTENDING PI..EADlliG
EX PARI'E ORDERS

-

PRE OSC MEDIATION

1.0

PRE OSC PREPARATICN

1.0

1.0

ORDER 'IO SHCM CAUSE

l.O

2.0

2.0

5

1.0

5.0

8.0

2.0

4.0

DEPO PREP.ARATICN

0

1.0

DEPC:BITION

1.0

0

3.0

3.0

3.0

ORir'.JZ PREPAPATICN
SUB'rorAL

1.0

3.0
1.0

2.0

10.0

MIDDLE PHASE
NEGOI'I.i\TICNS/SETTLEMENr

Disa:JVERY

I
4.0

2.0

3.0

SULLIVA..N VAWATION

0

0

BUSINESS VAWATICN

0

2.0

STJA..TUS REVJ::EW

0

0

1.0

1.0

SEITLEMENI' PREPARATION

0

0

1.0

1.0

0

0

2.0

2.0

0

0

2.0

4.0

6.0

17.0

PREPARATION OF AGREE11ENT OR BR±Ef

2.0

3.0

TRIAL PREPARATICN

2.0

3.0

TRIAL TIME

3.0

3.0

2 0

3.0

9.0

12.0

2.0

14.0

20.0

37.0

13.0

50.0

SE'I'I'l.EMENI'

o:::NFEREN::::E

liDDITICNAL OJNf'EREl'.O::S
SEI'TJ:.lllENT ProPOSAL

SUB'IOrA.L

5.0

5.0
2.0

!

4.0
9.0

26.0

I WINIXlP PHASE

POST TRIAL ACITON

SUB'IOTAL
'IDI'AI.S

I
~

3.0

I

3.0
2.0

5.0
3.0
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l set forth in AB 525,
re are
assets upon marriage

Besides the
possible ways
dissolution.
1.

Treat a
degree,
license to
practice
during marriage as
longing to that
person and not as co~~uni
property.
[See Todd v Todd,
272 Cal.App.2d 786 1969); In reMarriage of-xufmut~9
Cal.App.3d 446 (1979); Graham v Graham, Col.Sup.Ct., 574
P.2d 75 1978).

2.

Provide
ty property funds spent on a
spouse's educat
are a gi
to
community absent an
agreement to the contrary. This alternative would
include the part s' ability to execute a prenuptial
agreement.

3.

Treat a
's
practice as his
is owed an
rest.

4.

Allow a
con sol
[See Hubbard
6 F.

• .

wife had an
investment
train
.]

, degree, and license to
property in which the community

for unjust enrichment and
with the trial for dissolution.
~~~~~ Ok
.Sup.Ct., 603 P.2d 747,
ch
court held that Lhe
for the
education and

5.

Project what an
the course of a
projected ea
through a se
dollars. Give
installments

holder would earn over
, and subtract
difference
its value in current
that amount through

6.

Give
span comparab
degree.
f See

is earned during a time
took to earn the
i
Superior Court,
29 82),
which the
to practice
is community property
dissolution and
, the husband would
net income each year for
pa
on a quarterly
f
years.]

denti
subject
ordered
pay the
five years,
basis. Their

-159-

3'7
I

•

va
of the
sition of a
imate dollar
capacity, and
, of
wi 's
's dental
, Minn.Sup.Ct.,
~--~~~~~:.-·~~--~~~~---c--ourt awarded to the
1
expenses

8.

Allow

may

9.

10.

enac
career assets
them upon

acquired
d

r

re is 1
a money

-4However,
award may be
of one spouse toward
the
education of
Indiana Code Section

not limited to
made only for
tuition, books,
the other spouse.
31-1-11.5-11 (c)

dividing
part s' marital
In Wisconsin, the court,
contribution by one party to the
property, must consider "
earning power of the other."
education, train
or
767.255)
[Wisconsin Statutes Annotated

* * * * * *
To facilitate the discussion at the hearing, witnesses have been
asked to address the following questions:
1

-'"

.

"property" for

Should career assets be
purposes of
sso

?

2.

What should be includable as a career asset?

3.

What method should
for
valuation of career assets?

4.

Should career assets
property
dissolution

a monetary

as community
subject to division upon
?

5.

What manner of d
appropr ate?

career assets would be

6.

What
s, f any, shou
of career assets?

made in the division

ld be examined?

7.

8.

What
slature

If you would l
more in
contact me at (916) 445-4560.

discussed before the
to career assets?
t

ring, please

EXHIBIT B

JUNE 13, 1983
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE--1983-84 REGULAR SESSION

No. 525

ASSEMBLY

Introduced by
McAlister, Hughes, Agnos,
Alatorre, Allen, Bane,
Bergeson, Davis, Hayden
La Follette, ~fojonnier, Molina, Moore, Stirling, Tanner,
Maxine Waters, and Wright
Doolittle, Leroy Greene, Johnson,
'-AV'"-"'''-'• Robbins, Speraw, and Stiern)

February

,An act to
Section 5118 of, and add Section 5117 to,
the Civil Code, relating
community property.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

Community property.
uuJ""''""' that all real property
wherever
person while
property, except as
percentage of a person's

his or her employment
his or

earning capacity

of termination of h1~<>
solely to his or her
marriage is

only Jf
person
one-half the current ~'<due
contributed during the
or her earning cap;Jcity. The
a n1arriage vvherein no
-l 2-

AB 525
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children were either adopted or conceived by the husband
and wife and born alive during or ufter the marriage.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do em1ct as follmn:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26

27
28

29
30
31
32
33

SECTION l. Section 5117 is added to the Civil Code.
to read:
5117. (a) The percentage of a person's present and
future earnings from his or her employment that is equal
to the percentage of his or her earning capacity .,., hieh
was acquired dttring at the
of terrmiwtion of his or
her marriage, which not attributable solel_v to his or her
qualifications existing at the outset of the marriage is
community property.
(b) ror the purpose of this section, the person s
by that percentage of the
earning capacity is
uttributable to community
earning cap::~.city
property from <l
only if the person is
(c) This
reimbursed
uu'"'''-' for one-hnlf the eurren t
value of his or
property which contributed
to the attainment of his or her
during the
option for such reimbursement
earning capacity.
s spouse.
belongs to the
may choose whether or not to
(d) The
section discharged in a manner
have the
his or
portion of the
alternative
earnings as
person t:md Jn:'i or her
spouse :1gree on
m:mner and on the amount to be
delivered.
scc[jon h£1s been
(e)
to delivery of the
discharged i11 <1 manner
pertinent
as
the person :~·
a
nwrit:.d
lien,
on
the person :.,
spouse has a
present and
(I) This section not applicable to <l murriage wherein
no children were either adopted or conceived b)·
husbund tmd wlfe and born alive during or :zfter the
v i J \ . / U L....•

-16391l

llO

'-31 marri<lge.
2
SEC

Section 5118

AB 525
Civil Code is amended to

3 ret.zd:
4

5118.

5 earnings

6
7
8

Except as provided in Section 5117, the
accumulations of a spouse and the minor
living with, o:r in the custody of, the spouse,
separate and apart from the other spouse, are
property of the spouse.

-1649H
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HEGULAH SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 525

Introduced by Assemblymen McAlister, Hughes, Agnos,
Alatorre, Allen, Bane, Bates, Bergeson, Davis, Hayden
La Follette, Mojonnier, Molina, Moore, Stirling, Tanner,
Maxine \Vaters, and Wright
(Coauthors: Senators Doolittle, Leroy Greene, Johnson,
McCorquodale, Robbins, Speraw, and Stiern)

February 8, 1983

An act to add Section '51
community property.

to the Civil Code, relating to

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL"S DIGEST

Community property.
that all real property
situated
personal property, wherever
situated, acquired during marriage by a married person while
domiciled in this state
property, except as
specified.
This bill
specify that the percentage of a person's
present and future
which is equal to the percentage
of his or her
capacity which was acquired during the
marriage is
Vote: majority.
no.
committee: no.
State-mandated
enact ;ls follows:

The people

l
SECTION l.
17 is
to the Civil Code,
2 to read:
3
5117.
of a person's present and future
4 earnings
to the percentage of his or her
5 earning capacity which was acquired during the
-165-

99 40

AB

-2is

166-

99

40

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M. HARRIS,

AB 525

SUBJECT
and future
are (1)
termination of

This bill
earnings are
attributable to his
the marriage and (2)
qualifications exi

s

DIGEST

's earnings and
are their community
property.
Upon dissolution
with certain exceptions,
assets and liabilities

Existing law
accumulations
property, unless
as
,
court
or legal separat
divide t_he part s' community
equally.

Recent case law ho
that a
fessional education acquired
during the course
a marriage is neither community nor separate
property since it does not
the attributes of property.
In
re Marriage of Sullivan, 13 Cal.App.3d 634 (1982), hearing
granted October 28, 1982.
This bill wou
and future earnings
percentage of

of a person's present
which is equal to the
sting at the time when the
property.
However, earnings
is attributable solely to the
at
outset of the marriage

wou
a "marital lien" on a
in favor of the person's
to
the lien
that there is an
delivered.

on
The bill would also speci
1.

A person's
percentage
from a

2.

The provisions of
is
the person's spouse re

would be reduced by the
to community property
be applicable only if
s him for one-half the

(CONTINUED)
tant L.
11/16/83

67-
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a

STAFF COMMENTS

2.

s

INUED
AB 525
2

educat
f
the community
also has an

, or
not
st

which
ty

Should
s
the California
Sullivan?
3.

until after
s ruling in

This bill is premi
on
capac
during
marriage. The author claims that the real issue in cases
such as Sullivan is the
f
husband's earning
capacity, rather than the value of an education, degree, or
license to practice. A comparison is made to the concept of
good will in a business or professional practice. For many
years, the California courts have recognized that the marital
community may have a property interest in the good will of a
professional practice that has been built up during the
marriage.
(There are no fixed rules for determining the
value of good will. Some courts look at estimates of market
value, multiple or excess earnings, a percentage of one
year's income, and testimony of expert witnesses.
Other
courts enumerate a number of
to be considered.)
The
author argues that there is no good reason for giving
different legal treatment to a spouse's enhanced earning
capacity mere
because most or even all of that professional
practice lies in the future.
For purposes of
defined?

s

11,

II

capacity" be

1 education
property because it
property. However, the
s
broadly defined to be
or exchangab
value. For
are "
" include
ERISA
rement benefits,
term life insurance benefits.
to practice a
right.

4.

courts
profess

In opposit
to
s bill,
Estate Planning,
Trust and Probate Law Sect
"[e]arning
capacity is an amorphous
le to valuation
and inappropriate for treatment as property." Others believe
that a professional
, degree and license are merely
an "educational
the direct result of
a person's "
lity."
Should a "career asset" be
as property? Is earning
capacity actually comparable to good will or other intangible

(CONTINUED)
Consultant L. Young
11/16/83
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wou
a
outset of the
/valued fair
conf
to
to

5•

6•

What
property rights
earner? How
s of
of
ir
of
7.

earner.
on structuring
not
11

11?
8

$

{CONTINUED)
Consu

L.
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does not work at all, would the marital lien be cancelled?
How long would the marital lien last? Does this bill
represent a form of indentured servitude? Would this bill
work against the social policy of encouraging people to
realize their earning capacity?
9.

This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(b} would
require that a person's earning capacity be reduced by the
percentage of earning capacity attributable to community
property from a prior marriage.
Is this provision intended
to specify that community property from a previous marriage
would be treated the same as "qualifications existing at the
outset of the marriage"? If so, subdivision {b) should be
redrafted for clarity.

10. This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(c) would
require that, if a person's separate property had been used
to attain his earning capacity, the person's spouse would
have to reimburse him for "one-half of the current value" of
that separate property. The option for reimbursement would
rest with the person's spouse. Presumably, "current value"
would include inflation and the increased costs of attaining
the enhanced earning capacity.
Is the reimbursement intended
to be a strict prerequisite before the marital lien would be
applicable? If the person's spouse is unable to reimburse
him in cash, should there be an opportunity for an offset
against the interest in his enhanced earning capacity?
11. This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(d) would
provide that the marital lien may be discharged in a manner
alternative to that which is set forth in the bill when the
obligor and the obligee agree as to the manner and amount to
be delivered.
Should the bill take a more flexible approach
by instead authorizing the court to decide whether an
alternative manner and amount would be warranted under the
circumstances of the case?

12. The stated purpose of the bill is to address marriages in
ch there is little or no tangible community property upon
dissolution. However, the bill could be applied to long-term
marriages in vThich the spouses accumulated a considerable
amount of community property as a result of the earning
ability.
Should the court be given discretion to apply the
principle of enhanced earning capacity on a case by case
basis?

13. The bill would apply to enhanced earning capacity, however
minimal, if it was acquired during the marriage. Should the
bill require a showing of "substantial" enhancement? Would
this bill lead to prolonged trials over the existence, value,
and any appropriate division of a "career asset"? Would the
testimony of expert witnesses be essential?
(CONTINUED)
AB 525
Page 5

Consultant L. Young
11/16/83
-171-

4.

, the court may assign
receiving the education in
circumstances rendering such an
Sect
4800(b) (4)1
of educational loans to the
spouse's interest in

15.

property division
ls to receive a return on an
the other spouse's skills and
). According to the
be o set by spousal
f-support,
an award.
(But see
requires the court, in
consider
ified
other factors which it

that
equitable lump sum
considered. For
awarded
16.

bill take the most
's spouse instead be
f the student spouse's
in the marriage
Should
sion be made for an
approaches may also be
cases, the person's spouse
1 opportunity.

s

to marriages in which there
conceived and born alive
may create an
the Fourteenth
and Section 7 of
equal
an

Consultant L.
11/16/83

2-
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SOURCE
Author
SUPPORT
California Family Women
American Association of University Women - California
State Division
Private individuals
OPPOSITION
Family Law Section of the State Bar of California
Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the
State Bar of California
California Family Law Coalition
California Medical Association

AB 525

L. Young
11/16/83
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EXHIBIT C

RE

N

relating to

Expenses

-1

NOTE
This recommendation includes an explanatory Comment
to each section
recommended legislation. The
Comments are written as if the legislation were enacted
since their
purpose is to explain the law as it would
exist (if enacted) to those who will have occasion to use it
after it is in effect.
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EDUCATIONAL

no community assets to
having been used for
the community
earning capacity of the
working spouse.
generated efforts
working spouse.
the education, degree,
as "property,"
have urged
that results from
made property subject
enacted that an
payment to the
is currently pending
case of In re
issues.
has reviewed these
to fashion a fair resolution

spouse
before
Marriage
The
proposals

( !969); In reMarriage of Aufrnuth,
cuuuuuL~

of Divorce: Soc;:i/ and Economic Cons£:'quences
A
2S U.C.L:\. L Hev. 1181, 1210-21
.'darital Property in C:J/ifornia:
LJ 769, 81J-2l 1!982).
1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1J23, § 2).
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think is
try to
Commission's
reimburse
for his or her
gives the
spouse \Vas
use the money
purpose.
generating a
permanently
from the student
restores to
lost. It
disruption to
Despite
a number of
reimbursement
where the
substan tiall y
some cases
spouse's
marginally,
engages
irrelevant.
enhancement
student

spouse's
\Vhere

contributed for payment of

1 9-

'The

rate is

per

Proc.

685.010.

measure.

4800.3

as follows:

(b)

court may
quasi-community

divide

the court
conditions as it
equal division of the

may
deems
property.
(2)
an
property,
it

property and
less than five thousand dollars
located through the
court may award all
on such conditions as it
judgment decreeing the
decreeing the

In such C<ise,
damages shall be
proportions as the
at least one-half of
party who suffered
"community
means all money or
by a person in
for
or her
agreement for the

-1 -
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authority for
benefited
the education,
capacity is
for
(d);
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Note 33
ArlrPissibilitv
e1 idrrwc
In rc
of
1471\, .1/R
,:crtiorari
99
1023 [Main
Ind. 690, 4.N ! '.S. II 16,
I

a divorce dccTcc, the cc1urt rna) ~ubx·
modify the :~greemcm !he circumstance;;
Brokaw
App.l980, WR

lrgal
tron of

'.'utcd, until it
approved
pnraled and merged mtn
d\>c:ree and, hence, a
-;cttlerncnt agreement that ha' not been
hy dis:;olution COUrt 311d mr·nrrv<""!'<'<i
into decree has no
Amkrson, App.l9~'l,

any un-

on her, or that she suffered a11y
his alleged actions. In re Mar,.,__·'- - L
App.198 L 422 N. E.2d 342.

7-

; Till':

767.255

lU

7
;\ on:c
under

separation,
7G7.CJ2(1) (h), the
i(•s and divest and trnns' ,.
A cei tified copy ol \liP
real estate shall be lTthe county in v:hkh

Ol

court

l
'

may protect and pro·
aside a portion of
trust fer the supof any minor chilhavc been acquired by
I
as a gift,

the

\

I
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01

I

for hy either parproperty

ty

\

(Jf

such party

\l

and
in a

i

;jl

1

presume that all other
it's, hut may alter
m;1rital misconduct after consider-

t
't'll

l• r

1

ing:

l

:I'

party.

il)l,

assets not sub-
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'I

he
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i

';\!

;

1

4)

ional health of the parties.

(3)

11lc Pduca tion, truining or

t'ducational
ll'ngth of
fot ehildn·n
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a 1 a standn rd
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or the right
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EXHIBIT I
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DAVIS, CALIFORNIA
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November 12

The Honorable Elihu M. Harris
Chair
Committee on
tol
Sacramento, CA
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
I

raised
case
I am submitting
use. Members or
discuss my ideas -v;ith

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

invitation to
issues
At Hs, Young's
the Committees'
or

reach

Your
is
at a press
Dixon studies of nofault divorce in
in postdivorce wealth for
has been exacerbated

The ~:eitzman and
demonstrate
dramat

E. Harris
Nov. 12, 1983
Page

trial

in
The

of

for
are
and

~----~~-~~~~

such
would
)

situa(2)

account
ivan

( )
(4)

the

survive

E. Harris
Nov. 12, 1983
3

My own analysis of the
s that would
a
property division and roy discussion of the
that support some
in making awards areset forth in the enclosed
of
my article, "The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards
771
810-21, 853-55 (1982).
tive
(

(2)

)

Instead, let me summarize the
that I would most recommend:

features

The relief would be denominated lump sum
forth in a code section separate from either
or §4801 (traditional
).
des
rel
would
the
'
be determined by
This doctrine
court.
To deal with pass
to order that the
cases.

the

of

of the
of

the court would be authorized
tallments in approrp

)

(5)

5
s

.B. 525

and
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E. Harris
Nov. 12,
Page 4

ion

Law Revis ion
drafted it appears
out-of-pocket amounts
Although the
a court to look
the
plate

been

As

agreements

almost

is.

tate
treatment of propertv
that it is

, Harris
Nov. 1 ,

the

characterization of enhanced
would be a diff

it should
noted that
outlined

se f
Street
c

Park

c

Awards."
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